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Abstract
Scope economies resulting from the joint offering of loans and savings accounts (as opposed to
loans only) are customarily invoked to promote the transformation of credit-only microfinance
institutions (MFIs) into integrated loans-and-savings entities. To ensure robust inference, we
estimate scope economies for the microfinance industry using a novel approach which, among its
other advantages, accommodates inherent heterogeneity across loans-only and loans-and-savings
MFIs as well as controls for endogenous self-selection of institutions into the either type. For
analysis, we use a large 2004–2014 Mixmarket dataset. Unlike earlier studies, we do not find
prevalent scope economies in the microfinance industry. We find that the median degree of scope
economies is statistically indistinguishable from zero and that scope economies are significantly
positive for less than a half of loans-and-savings MFIs. For a non-trivial 14% of institutions,
the empirical evidence suggests the existence of significantly negative diseconomies of scope
indicating that the separate production of loans and savings accounts actually has the potential
to reduce an MFI’s costs. We also find that the failure to account for endogenous selectivity
dramatically overestimates the degree of scope economies resulting in the failure to detect scope
diseconomies among MFIs. Thus, our findings call for caution when invoking scope economies
as a blanket justification for universal expansion of the scope of financial operations by MFIs.
Instead, promoting integrated loans-and-savings MFIs may be justifiable as a means to meeting
the needs of the poor rather than as a way for the industry to save costs.
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mediation, savings and lending
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1 Introduction
The microfinance industry consists of diverse entities offering small-scale financial products to the
poor who lack access to standard banking services. In the past two decades, a major trend in the
industry has been for typical loans-only microfinance institutions (MFIs) engaged solely in lending
activities to transform into loans-and-saving MFIs that also offer saving products to their customers.
While a decade ago no more than a third of MFIs (including credit unions) offered voluntary savings
accounts, by 2014 (last year in our dataset) the share of such loans-and-savings MFIs had increased
dramatically to about 54%. Policymakers, donors and socially oriented investors have provided
incentives for MFIs to get licensed to collect savings deposits or have preferred to fund mainly loans-
and-savings MFIs in part to respond to the evidence that the poor demand more than just loans
(Collins et al., 2009). The main objective however has been to promote MFIs’ self-sustainability, to
improve their access to commercial funds and thereby to decrease their subsidy-dependence. The
promotion of integrated loans-and-savings MFIs has been justified on the grounds of their potential
performance improvements of which there are two commonly invoked sources. First, a license to
collect savings deposits from customers is usually associated with the ability of MFIs to overcome
size barriers to entry and thus to capitalize on scale economies associated with larger size. Second
and more importantly, improvements in MFIs’ performance have been expected to emerge from
scope economies stemming from the joint delivery of (micro)loans and (micro)savings.
Since significant resources are used to promote organizational transformation of MFIs as well as
because preferential funding to loans-and-savings MFIs leaves loans-only MFIs with less resources
available, it is imperative that the claims about existing scope economies be substantiated with ro-
bust empirical findings. Anecdotal evidence or stakeholders’ believes are hardly sufficient to inform
the choice of an industry serving over 170 million poor clients worldwide (Microfinance Information
Exchange, 2015). Furthermore, providing financial services to the poor remains challenging and,
in the absence of substantial scope and/or scale economies, loans-and-savings MFIs may end up
with a “mission drift” away from serving their target customers. For instance, while the financial
sustainability of Grameen Bank, a flagship MFI, had improved materially after it changed its busi-
ness model to start offering microsavings, these improvements also coincided with a simultaneous
abandonment of its poorest clients (Hulme, 2008).1 Once licensed to collect savings deposits, loans-
and-savings MFIs become subject to banking regulations, and there is substantial evidence that the
new, more stringent supervisory environment entices profit-oriented MFIs to curtail outreach to
women and, more generally, to costly-to-reach-customers (Cull et al., 2011). While scope economies
have been studied for commercial banks engaged in the traditional financial intermediation (e.g.,
Berger et al., 1987, 1999; Saunders, 2000) as well as for those with more diversified activities (El-
sas et al., 2010), the results from these bank-centered studies cannot be easily extended to MFIs
owing to their specific outreach mission. This warrants a rigorous stand-alone measurement of
scope economies in the microfinance industry based on recent data reflective of changes that the
industry has gone through. In the absence of such scope economies, the simultaneous satisfaction
of outreach and sustainability may remain a challenge.
In this paper, we seek to provide robust empirical evidence on the existence, magnitude and
the distribution of scope economies (if any) in the microfinance industry worldwide during a more
recent time period (2004–2014) relative to the existing work based on the data prior to 2006. Our
contribution to the literature is as follows. First, when assessing the extent of scope economies
in MFIs, we allow loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs to have heterogeneous production tech-
1Similar results have also been found for other transformed MFIs worldwide; e.g., see Woller et al. (1999) and
Wagenaar (2012).
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nologies, which is starkly different from the approach pursued in virtually all prior studies of scope
economies in the industry that estimate a single microfinance cost structure a priori presumed to
be common to all MFIs with no regard to their heterogeneous mixes of financial services offered to
customers. Second, our methodology explicitly recognizes that the above technological heterogene-
ity is an outcome of endogenous self-selection by institutions whereby offering deposit accounts as
an additional financial service (and consequently adopting the appropriate production technology
to keep costs at minimum) is the endogenous decision of MFIs. Hence, it would be econometri-
cally inappropriate to treat the observed type of an MFI—loans-only versus loans-and-savings—as
being exogenously/randomly assigned, likely resulting in inconsistent and potentially misleading es-
timates of scope economies. To our knowledge, no prior study has entertained this likely possibility.
Third, we employ Kyriazidou’s (1997) semiparametric kernel estimator to estimate microfinance
technologies with selectivity, which allows for unobserved heterogeneity across MFIs and does not
require distributional assumption or parametrization of the dependence between the outcome and
selection equations. By using this model, we are able to strike a balance between mitigating po-
tential misspecification (e.g., by avoiding a restrictive and potentially incorrect bivariate normality
assumption in the popular Heckman’s selection model) and alleviating the curse-of-dimensionality
problem immanent in nonparametric methods.2 Fourth, building on Malikov et al.’s (2016) work,
in contrast to popular alternatives employed in the microfinance literature, our measurement of
scope economies does not rely on a rather unrealistic assumption whereby specialized loans-only
MFIs share the same technology with and incur the same fixed costs as do the integrated loans-
and-savings MFIs. The latter substantially decreases the reliance of our scope economies estimates
on counterfactuals thereby minimizing the “excessive extrapolation” problem (Evans & Heckman,
1984) that most studies of scope economies inherently suffer from. Lastly but not least importantly,
we use more recent data on MFIs from around the world during the 2004–2014 period which de-
scribes an industry much different from that analyzed in earlier work. Altogether, we are therefore
able to offer policy-makers and stakeholders a fresher and more robust perspective on benefits and
costs of promoting integrated loans-and-savings MFIs on grounds of the cost saving potential due
to scope economies.
To briefly preview the results, we find that the microfinance industry largely exhibits invariance
to scope of outputs produced, with the median degree of scope economies estimated at statistically
insignificant –0.06. After controlling for endogenous self-selection, scope economies are significantly
positive for 46% of loans-and-savings MFIs only. Perhaps more importantly, for a non-trivial 14%
of institutions, the empirical evidence suggests the existence of significantly negative diseconomies
of scope indicating that the separate production of loans and savings accounts actually has the
potential to reduce an MFI’s costs. The mean degree of scope diseconomies for these multi-output
MFIs is estimated at a sizable –0.21 implying, on average, the potential for a 21% cost saving if the
joint production of loans and savings is replaced with two single-output MFIs. However, note that
the presence of such scope diseconomies in no way implies cost inefficiency or sub-optimality on the
part of these loans-and-savings MFIs. Neither does it say that these MFIs may not reduce their
costs by scaling up their operations to capitalize on (universally) significant scale economies. It
does however suggest that it may be ill-advised to invoke scope economies as a blanket justification
for universal expansion of the scope of financial operations by MFIs. After all, scope economies are
significantly positive only for 46% of MFIs, with the average value estimated at a non-negligible
0.23. (The analysis of temporal dynamics in these scope economies shows that their magnitude as
2The problem refers to the phenomenon whereby the convergence rate of a nonparametric estimator worsens with
an increase in the number of continuous covariates in the model. We circumvent this problem by imposing some
parametric structure on the outcome equation; hence, we have a “semiparametric” model.
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well as the prevalence in the industry have been steadily declining, especially in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis.) For 50% of institutions, the costs exhibit scope invariance as indicated
by statistically insignificant estimates of the degree of scope economies.
Among prior studies, Hartarska et al. (2011) and Delgado et al. (2015), who also estimate the
degree of scope economies in microfinance, are perhaps the most closely related to our paper.3
However, both of these studies estimate a single cost function for all MFIs regardless of financial
services they offer (or do not offer) and consequently do not correct for MFIs’ endogenous self-
selection into the loans-and-savings type.4 Also, these papers study the period before the financial
crisis [Delgado et al. (2015) use data up to 2006, and Hartarska et al.’s (2011) data stop in 2008]
when the loans-and-savings institutions comprised only about a fifth of the microfinance industry,
whereas such MFIs are the majority in our 2004–2014 data. In contrast to our results, whereby
the median degree of scope economies estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero, Delgado
et al. (2015) report significantly positive scope economies of about 10% at the median. As a matter
of fact, they find that as many as 65% of MFIs in their sample exhibit statistically significant
scope economies leading them to conclude that “in general MFIs realize positive and significant
reductions in costs from offering both loans and savings” (Delgado et al., 2015, p.212) which starkly
differs from the conclusion we arrive at using our robust methodology and more recent data. Our
findings also differ from those by Hartarska et al. (2011) who too generally find empirical support
for positive scope economies in the industry with the statistically significant median estimate of
19%. They also hardly find any evidence of diseconomies of scope among MFIs with most of their
reported negative estimates being statistically insignificant instead suggesting scope invariance,
whereas we find that the MFIs with significantly negative scope diseconomies actually constitute
a non-negligible 14% of the microfinance industry. Other related studies of MFIs’ performance
have focused on scale economies and efficiency. The results generally point to prevalent increasing
returns to scale (which we confirm as well) and non-ignorable heterogeneity in cost effectiveness of
MFIs depending on their subsidy-reliance and target clientele (Caudill et al., 2009; Hartarska et al.,
2013).5 More recently, D’Espallier et al. (2017) have examined how the financial performance of
MFIs changes with their transformation from non-governmental organizations into banks.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Our framework for modeling the microfinance produc-
tion technology and measuring endogenous scope economies in the industry is introduced in Section
2. Section 3 then presents our two-step semiparametric estimation methodology. We discuss the
data in Section 4. The empirical results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Endogenous Scope Economies
In order to examine whether MFIs have access to the untapped cost saving potential due to scope
and/or scale economies, we first need to formalize the model of their production costs.
Following the vast majority of banking and microfinance literature, we model the production
technology of MFIs via dual cost function. Not only is the dual cost approach to modeling microfi-
3Two other studies of scope economies use the same methods but focus on differences attributable to alternative
measures of output quantities (Hartarska et al., 2010) and on linking scope economies to the MFI governance
attributes (Hartarska et al., 2013).
4In contrast, we find that the data consistently reject the null of common technology shared by loans-only and
loans-and-savings MFIs and that the selection between the two in not exogenous/ignorable.
5 Hartarska et al. (2013) find substantial increasing returns to scale for all but profitability-focused deposit-mobilizing
MFIs. Caudill et al. (2009) show that MFIs, which get more cost effective over time, are less reliant on subsidies
and are more likely to target women.
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nance technology convenient because it facilitates the direct measurement of MFIs’ costs necessary
for the evaluation of their scope economies, but it also does not require the use of input quantities
during the estimation (unlike in the primal production framework) which can lead to simultane-
ity problems since the input allocation is endogenous to MFIs. The structural identification of
cost functions instead relies on the exogeneity of competitively set input prices along with output
quantities being fixed (at least in the short run) as theoretically justified on the grounds of cost
minimization premise widely accepted in the financial services literature [e.g., see Hughes & Mester
(2015) for an excellent review]. The use of cost function is also advantageous over an alternative
dual specification of production technology in the form of a profit function which requires infor-
mation on output prices. First, the microfinance industry does not collect consistent output price
data (i.e., interest rates charged on various loans). Furthermore, while being price takers in the
input markets, MFIs have some market power in the output market because they serve poor clients
whom other traditional lenders tend to avoid. In the market for inputs, the environment is however
largely competitive: MFIs pay competitive salaries for relatively skilled labor such as loan officers,
compete with peers worldwide for the access to financial capital (equity, loans and donations) and
participate in a competitive market for physical infrastructure. Therefore, while input prices are
widely accepted to be exogenous, the same cannot be easily afforded for output prices thereby mak-
ing the estimation of dual profit functions problematic from an econometric point of view. Also,
MFIs are organizationally diverse and, while some operate as for-profit entities, a larger fraction
of them remain non-profit thus rendering the profit-maximizing objective somewhat questionable.
Lastly but not least importantly, the stated objectives of microfinance are (i) outreach, or serving
marginalized clients, and (ii) sustainability, which is widely understood as covering cost as opposed
to maximizing profits.
Given the bank’s core functions as a financial intermediary, most empirical studies of the per-
formance of commercial banks apply the so-called “intermediation approach” when modeling their
production technology. In this approach, deposits are conceptualized as inputs to the production of
various types of loans and investments which are all treated as outputs. Unlike commercial banks,
MFIs are however focused more on serving the marginalized clientele and not on intermediation per
se (Cull et al., 2011). Specifically, MFIs offer costly, characteristically small-scale savings accounts
to their clientele because the poor need such services (Collins et al., 2009); offering these microsav-
ings meets the industry’s larger overarching objective to expand the financial frontier and to offer a
wide range of financial services to the marginalized clients excluded from a formal financial sector.
This contrasts with the banks’ goals of mobilizing deposits in order to decrease the cost of capital
and extend loans. Indeed, the capital structure of MFIs primarily includes equity (if organized as
a shareholder company) or quasi-equity (accumulated donations and start-up capital), loans from
commercial banks, socially motivated lenders, governmental and intra-governmental organizations,
and deposits, if an MFI collects them. To extend loans to their clients, MFIs rely on own capital
and loans more than on the savings deposits, mainly because of the limited availability of savings
among the poor living in urban slums or remote rural areas. This distinction is apparent in the
capital structure of MFIs relative to that of banks. While banks worldwide have the deposits-to-
assets ratio of over 80% (Barth & Wihlborg, 2017), in our sample of loans-and-savings MFIs, this
ratio is only half of that at 43%.6 The share of MFIs’ “own” capital in the form of equity and
quasi-equity comprises 26%, while the non-deposit borrowed funds take up 29%; together, these
two sources are larger than savings. Thus, the production of microdeposits in itself is one of the
MFI’s goals aimed at meeting the demands of the target clientele. Therefore, following the bulk of
6Our data reveal that even the MFIs organized as banks have the deposits-to-assets ratio of 48% with other types of
MFIs such as non-governmental organizations having the ratio of only 25%.
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microfinance literature, we adopt a modified “production approach” to microfinance, whereby de-
posits are treated as outputs, which is better suited to study MFIs (Caudill et al., 2009; Hartarska
et al., 2011, 2013; Hermes et al., 2011; Delgado et al., 2015). In fact, we formally test if our data
corroborate such an approach by empirically verifying the output-like role of microdeposits before
proceeding to the estimation of our main model (see Section 5).
Within this approach, the two outputs are the total dollar value of (micro)loans (y1) and
(micro)deposits (y2), where the latter savings deposits are also sometimes interchangeably referred
to as (micro)savings. The four inputs to the microfinance production are labor (x1), physical capital
(x2), financial capital (x3) and equity (e). The labor input is measured by the number of employees
with the corresponding input price (w1) being the average annual wage. Physical capital is defined
as the number of physical offices (including mobile facilities) that the MFI operates to extend loans
and collect savings deposits; the corresponding input price (w2) is the non-labor operating cost per
office. Financial capital is the non-deposit borrowed funds with the corresponding price w3. The
treatment of equity as an input to the microfinance production technology is consistent with the
argument that MFIs may use it as a source of loanable funds and thus as a cushion against losses.
However, due to the unavailability of the price of equity, we adopt the common practice in the
banking literature by modeling it as a quasi-fixed input (the other three inputs are said to be freely
varying). Lastly, the MFI’s variable cost (C) is defined as the sum of expenditures on the above
three variable inputs and thus measures the operating and non-deposit financial expenses.
2.1 Heterogeneous Microfinance Technologies
Virtually all prior attempts to empirically assess the extent of scope economies in the microfinance
industry have done so by estimating a single multi-output cost function for all MFIs with no regard
to their heterogeneous output mixes. Such an approach is problematic at least on two fronts.
First, it embodies a rather strong and unrealistic assumption that loans-only and loans-and-
savings MFIs share the same underlying production technology despite apparent differences in the
scope of their outputs. Under this assumption, the cost structure of the loan issuance operations
by MFIs is a priori presumed to be the same for both loans-only and loans-and-savings institutions
thereby effectively implying that the microfinance production technology is invariant to the scope
of produced outputs. Essentially, such an approach takes the observed technological heterogeneity
across MFIs in the form of their differing output mixes completely for granted, which is likely to
result in the loss of information and the misspecification of an econometric model. Therefore, in
our paper, we model the cost structure of loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs separately.
Second and perhaps most importantly, the conventional single-equation approach fails to rec-
ognize that the above technological heterogeneity is likely to be an outcome of endogenous self-
selection by institutions. That is, offering voluntary savings accounts as an additional financial
service to their customers — and consequently adopting the appropriate production technology to
produce all outputs at the minimum cost — is the endogenous decision that MFIs make based on
the set of relevant internal and external factors. If so, it is econometrically inappropriate to treat
the observed type of an MFI (loans-only versus loans-and-savings) as being exogenously/randomly
assigned. We therefore explicitly model endogenous selection of the output scope and the corre-
sponding output-mix-specific production technology by MFIs.
Specifically, we consider the following (output-mix-specific) heterogeneous dual variable cost
functions for loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs:
C1 (w, e, y1) = inf
x
{
x′w | T1 (x, e, y1) ≤ 1
}
if D = 1 (2.1)
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C2 (w, e, y1, y2) = inf
x
{
x′w | T2 (x, e, y1, y2) ≤ 1
}
, if D = 2 (2.2)
where x = (x1, x2, x3)
′ is a vector of variable inputs with the corresponding vector of input prices
w = (w1, w2, w3)
′. The production transformation functions Tr(·) and the associated variable cost
functions Cr(·) for r = 1, 2 are allowed to vary across the two types of MFIs not only in their
dimensionality (five versus six covariates) but also in their underlying specification. We therefore
index them differently. Only one of these two cost functions applies to a given MFI as captured
by the indicator variable D which equals 1 for loans-only institutions (i.e., if y2 = 0) and 2 for
the more diversified loans-and-savings MFIs (i.e., if y2 > 0). In turn, we can conceptualize the
endogenous determination of the MFI type (i.e., whether y2 > 0 or not) in the form of the following
output-mix-selection equation:
D = 1 + 1{D∗ ≥ 0}, (2.3)
where D∗ is a latent variable representing the MFI’s propensity to expand the scope of its outputs
by adding voluntary savings accounts y2 to the menu of its financial services; and 1{·} is the
standard indicator function.
Note that, by modeling cost structures of loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs separately, we
are able to explicitly accommodate potential discontinuities (say, due to parameter instability) in
the MFI’s variable cost function across different financial service menus, which are likely to arise
due to the change in dimensionality of the cost function’s support across the two types of MFIs
(since the number of outputs is not the same). Further, unlike the widely used single-equation
model where a common cost relationship is assumed to be shared by all MFIs regardless of their
output mixes, the output-mix-specific cost functions in (2.1)–(2.2) do not suffer from the problem
of having to deal with zeros reported for y2 that loans-only MFIs do not produce. In our case, the
cost function contains only those outputs that MFIs actually produce and thus are non-zero. That
is, having loans-only MFIs not offer voluntary savings accounts is being treated not as a simple
matter of the variable y2 taking a zero value but rather as an indication that this variable does not
enter the loans-only MFI’s cost optimization problem whatsoever.
2.2 Measuring Scope Economies
The output-mix-specific variable cost functions in (2.1)–(2.2) can readily be used to compute the
degree of scope economies (if any) for the microfinance industry. Such scope economies are said
to exist if the firm’s average cost declines with the increase in the number of outputs it produces
(Panzar & Willig, 1981). If the latter were the case for MFIs, one would expect loans-and-savings
institutions to generally incur lower average costs than loans-only MFIs do ceteris paribus. This may
occur for a number of reasons including the potential to spread fixed costs over the larger output mix
as well as cost complementarities across different products. For instance, spreading fixed costs over
the expanded product mix can contribute to scope economies of MFIs if the provision of loans and
savings jointly (rather than separately) reduces institutions’ excess capital capacity. On the other
hand, cost complementarities may also lead to scope economies if consumer information developed
in the production of either loans or savings is being reused by MFIs to reduce the monitoring
requirements of the other product.
In what follows, we describe our methodology for measuring the degree of scope economies in
the microfinance industry. To help us highlight its merits over the existing less robust alternatives,
we first consider the more conventional approach to quantifying the degree of economies of scope
that most prior studies have resorted to. Specifically, if we were to follow the literature and employ
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the traditional measurement of scope economies a` la Baumol et al. (1982), then a (multi-output)
loans-and-savings MFI would be said to enjoy economies of scope if the cost of producing loans and
savings individually is greater than the cost of their joint production, i.e.,
C2(y1, 0) + C2(0, y2) > C2(y1, y2), (2.4)
where we have suppressed all other arguments of the variable cost function besides outputs.
Naturally, the evaluation of (2.4) requires computation of the counterfactual cost of producing
each of the two outputs separately with the counterfactual being defined as the case of fully special-
ized single-output production processes. As emphasized by Evans & Heckman (1984) and Hughes
& Mester (1993), the approach expectedly suffers from the “excessive extrapolation” problem since
the two needed counterfactuals require a projection of the estimated multi -output cost function
C2(·, ·) to the case of complete single-output specializations (y1, 0) and (0, y2). Further, not only
does the measure in (2.4) extrapolate the estimated C2(·, ·) to its boundary, but it also assumes
that the specialized single-output MFIs share the same technology and incur the same fixed costs
as the integrated loans-and-savings MFIs, which is rather unrealistic (see Fuss & Waverman, 2002).
Therefore, in order to alleviate the “excessive extrapolation” problem to the largest degree
feasible, in this paper we seek to minimize the extent of extrapolation required for the measurement
of scope economies. Building on Malikov et al. (2016), we do so in several ways.
First, we make explicit use of the observed technological heterogeneity across loans-only and
loans-and-savings MFIs, which the literature has largely ignored. The existence of fully specialized
loans-only institutions uniquely enables us to identify their single-output cost relationship, which
we can use in order to decrease the number of counterfactuals necessary for the evaluation of
scope economies in the industry from two to one. More specifically, we adapt the measure of
scope economies for loans-and-savings MFIs to reflect the following more theoretically accurate
cost comparison:
C1(y1) + C2(0, y2) > C2(y1, y2), (2.5)
where the more appropriate single-output loans-only cost function C1(·) is now being used to
evaluate the cost of producing y1 separately. The definition in (2.5) is therefore “less counter” to
factum. Nonetheless, while constituting an improvement over the more conventional (2.4), the mod-
ified scope economies measure in (2.5) still requires extrapolation of the multi-output cost function
C2(·, ·). Indeed, it would be most desirable to also use the single-output savings-only cost function
when computing the cost of producing y2 separately. For instance, such an approach would be in
line with Berger et al.’s (2000) study of scope economies in the U.S. insurance industry in which
the authors also differentiate between heterogeneous specialized and joint production technologies
(although, unlike us, without accounting for the endogenous selection thereof). Unfortunately, the
latter is infeasible in our case owing to the non-existence of such savings-only MFIs in practice,
which preclude us from identifying their cost function.7 However, we can avoid the extreme extrap-
olation of C2(·, ·) to the non-existent counterfactual case of the full specialization in y2 by instead
focusing on its most closely related output-mix configuration observable in the data, namely the
production of (y1, y2) exhibiting a higher degree of specialization in y2.
Specifically, in line with Evans & Heckman (1984), a loans-and-savings MFI is then said to
7Berger et al. (2000) happen to observe “specialists” of both kinds which uniquely enables them to successfully
identify cost functions for all specialized insurers. In the case of microfinance industry however, we only have data
on one type of specialized firms, which ultimately necessitates extrapolation of the joint technology to the case of
specialization in one of the two inputs.
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enjoy economies of scope if
C1
(
$y1
)
+ C2
(
(1−$)y1, y2
)
> C2
(
y1, y2
)
, (2.6)
where 0 ≤ $ ≤ 1 is some distribution weight. Note that (2.6) does not require the computation
of the cost for a non-existent fully specialized MFI producing exclusively y2 (unless $ = 1). To
operationalize our measure of scope economies in (2.6), we need to specify the distribution weight
$. To further avoid excessive extrapolation, we follow Evans & Heckman (1984) and restrict the
choice of $ to the “admissible region”. More concretely, we ensure that each counterfactual MFI
does not produce less of each output than MFIs actually do in the data.8 Therefore, we require that
$y1 ≥ y1 and (1−$)y1 ≥ y1, where y1 denotes sample minimum of y1. We make this constraint
more operational by defining our measure of the degree of scope economies (DSE) as follows
DSE =
[
C1
(
$y∗1 + y1
)
+ C2
(
(1−$)y∗1 + y1, y2
)]
− C2
(
y1, y2
)
C2
(
y1, y2
) , (2.7)
where y∗1 = y1− 2y1. Thus, DSE measures the within-sample scope economies, positive (negative)
values of which correspond to economies (diseconomies) of scope. The instance of DSE=0 indicates
invariance of costs to the scope of outputs.
Lastly, our scope economies measure is obviously dependent on the choice of the $ weight.
To circumvent this problem, we adopt a conservative approach to measuring the degree of scope
economies, whereby we choose $ (via a grid search) that yields the smallest value for DSE in the
admissible region. Specifically, we measure the the degree of “global” economies of scope (for each
MFI) as follows:
DGSE = inf
$
DSE($). (2.8)
The intuition is as follows. If scope economies of the smallest degree are still statistically
significantly above zero, we can conclude that scope economies are “globally” significant over the
loans-and-savings MFI’s entire (admissible) output space in a given year. Combined with the fact
that we employ the more theoretically appropriate cost function when evaluating the counterfactual
cost of producing y1, the latter renders our methodology significantly more robust to excessive
extrapolation than that routinely employed in the literature.
3 Semiparametric Estimation
In this section, we describe an econometric model that we employ in order to estimate the cost
structure of microfinance institutions while allowing for both the observed and unobserved techno-
logical heterogeneity across MFIs producing different output mixes, the choice of which is itself an
outcome of endogenous self-selection. Readers not interested in the estimation details may jump
directly to Section 4.
We let our model of output-mix-specific heterogeneous dual variable cost functions for loans-only
and loans-and-savings MFIs subject to sample selection in (2.1)–(2.3) take the following form:
log(C1,it) = log(v1,it)
′β1 +
1
2 log(v1,it)
′B1 log(v1,it) + µ1,i + u1,it if Dit = 1 (3.1)
8The admissible region in Evans & Heckman (1984) or Malikov et al. (2016) also regulates the range of values for
the ratio of distributed outputs. In our case, such a constraint is redundant (and therefore omitted) because the
computation of scope economies involves the distribution of a single output only, namely y1.
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log(C2,it) = log(v2,it)
′β2 +
1
2 log(v2,it)
′B2 log(v2,it) + µ2,i + u2,it if Dit = 2 (3.2)
D∗it = z
′
itγ − vit with vit ≡ ζi + it, (3.3)
where we have specified unknown cost functions C1(·) and C2(·) as flexible second-order expan-
sions in logs. Here, v1,it ≡ (w′it, e, y1,it)′ and v2,it ≡ (w′it, e, y1,it, y2,it)′ are the vectors of (strictly
exogenous) arguments to the cost function for loans-only and loans-and-savings loans, respectively,
with their corresponding conformable first-order parameter vectors β1 and β2 and second-order
symmetric parameter matrices B1 and B2. The MFI type indicator variable Dit = 1 + 1{D∗ ≥ 0}
is as defined earlier, with the latent D∗it being modeled as a function of some relevant contextual
variables zit capturing the institution’s internal and external environment. Lastly, u1,it, u2,it and
it are the i.i.d. random errors.
Note that the unknown parameters differ across (3.1) and (3.2) thereby allowing for (observed)
technological heterogeneity across loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs. We also allow for un-
observed heterogeneity amongst individual institutions as captured by MFI-specific unobserved
effects µ1,i, µ2,i and ζi. We treat the unobserved effects in the outcome equations µ1,i and µ2,i as
capturing the fixed-effect-type heterogeneity by allowing these effects to correlate with any of the
right-hand-side covariates in an arbitrary way.9 However, given that such fixed effects are difficult
to accommodate in a semiparametric distribution-free estimation of nonlinear selection equations
(which we seek to employ in our paper for robustness purposes), we assume that ζi is a random
effect, implying that the composite error term in the selection equation vit is also i.i.d.
Essentially, system in (3.1)–(3.3) is a panel data endogenous switching regressions model, where
(3.1)–(3.2) are the outcome equations of interest and (3.3) is a selection equation governing the
self-selection of MFIs into either the loans-only or loans-and-savings type. We assume that random
disturbances (u1,it, u2,it, vit) are i.i.d. over i with zero means and finite variances and are strictly
mean-independent of right-hand-side covariates, i.e., E[ur,it|χr,i] = 0 and E[vit|χr,i] = 0 with χr,i ≡
[log(vr,i1)
′, . . . , log(vr,iT )′, z′i1, . . . , z
′
iT , µr,i] ∀ r = 1, 2. However, the distributions of these random
errors are allowed to correlate, i.e., E[ur,itvit|χr,i] 6= 0 ∀ r = 1, 2. That is, we allow for the
correlation between the disturbances in outcome equations (3.1)–(3.2) and that in the selection
equation (3.3). Ignoring this correlation would naturally lead to selection bias in the estimates of
outcome equations of interest (the cost functions) and hence the estimates of scope economies.
To see why the estimation of cost functions in (3.1)–(3.2) suffers from selectivity bias, consider
the following. First, for convenience, define ωr,i ≡ (log(vr,it)′, log(vr,is)′, z′it, z′is, µi)′ for r = 1, 2
and t 6= s. One may naturally be inclined to estimate unknown parameters in (3.1)–(3.2) by first-
differencing respective “selected” samples of loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs in order to
remove unknown fixed effects, i.e., using the observations for which Dit = Dis (t 6= s) are jointly
equal to either 1 or 2. The procedure yields the cost function in first differences:
log(Cr,it)− log(Cr,is) =
[
log(vr,it)− log(vr,is)
]′
βr +
1
2
[
vec{log(vr,it) log(vr,it)′} − vec{log(vr,is) log(vr,is)′}
]′
vec{Br} +
ur,it − ur,is if Dit = Dis = r (t 6= s), (3.4)
where “vec{·}” denotes the column-wise vectorization operator. However, one generally should not
expect E[ur,it|Dit = Dis = r (t 6= s),ωr,i] = 0 or E[ur,it|Dit = Dis = r (t 6= s),ωr,i] = E[ur,is|Dit =
Dis = r (t 6= s),ωr,i]. Therefore, if we do not control for selection explicitly, the first-differenced
error term (ur,it − ur,is) in (3.4) is likely to correlate with the right-hand-side covariates thereby
9Note that nothing precludes µ1,i and µ2,i from being the same, i.e., the special case of µ1,i = µ2,i.
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resulting in inconsistent estimates of unknown coefficients βr and Br for r = 1, 2 (essentially, due
to the “omitted variable bias”). We therefore explicitly recognize the presence of the selectivity
effect and, for r = 1, 2, rewrite outcome equations in (3.1)–(3.2) as partially linear equations of the
following form:
log(Cr,it) = log(vr,it)
′βr +
1
2 log(vr,it)
′Br log(vr,it) + µr,i + θr,it + er,it if Dit = r, (3.5)
where θr,it ≡ E[ur,it|Dit = Dis = r (t 6= s),ωr,i] is an unknown sample selection bias term, and
er,it ≡ ur,it − θr,it is a new random disturbance such that E[er,it|Dit = Dis = r (t 6= s),ωr,i] = 0 by
construction.
Intuitively, we could consistently estimate the outcome equation in (3.5) via some procedure that
removes not only the unknown fixed effect µr,i but also the unknown selectivity effect θr,it. We ac-
complish the latter by following a semiparametric approach proposed by Kyriazidou (1997). Specif-
ically, under the “conditional exchangeability” assumption, according to which (ur,it, ur,is, vit, vis)
and (ur,is, ur,it, vis, vit) for t 6= s are identically distributed conditional on ωr,i,10 for some ith MFI
of type r = 1, 2 such that z′itγ = z
′
isγ (t 6= s), we have that11
θr,it = E[ur,it|Dit = Dis = r (t 6= s),ωr,i]
=
{
E[ur,it|vit > z′itγ, vis > z′isγ (t 6= s),ωr,i] for r = 1
E[ur,it|vit ≤ z′itγ, vis ≤ z′isγ (t 6= s),ωr,i] for r = 2
=
{
E[ur,is|vis > z′itγ, vit > z′isγ (t 6= s),ωr,i] for r = 1
E[ur,is|vis ≤ z′itγ, vit ≤ z′isγ (t 6= s),ωr,i] for r = 2
= θr,is. (3.6)
The result in (3.6) says that the sample selection bias term for the ith r-type unit such that
z′itγ = z
′
isγ (t 6= s), i.e., for an MFI with the same likelihood of self-selecting into either the
loans-only or loans-and-savings type in period t and s, is the same for the two time periods and
hence can be removed for these observations along with µi via first differencing across periods t
and s( 6= t). That is, in theory, the outcome equation of interest could be consistently estimated
for each output-mix type of MFIs via conventional least squares performed on the first-differenced
“selected” sample consisting of MFIs of a given type for which ∆z′itγ ≡ (zit−zis)′γ = 0, where “∆”
designates the first-difference operator. In practice, such an estimator would however be infeasible
for two reasons: (i) γ is normally unknown, and (ii) Pr[∆z′itγ = 0] = 0 so long as zit contains at
least one continuous variable rendering ∆z′itγ a continuous variable too.
To overcome these two problems and thereby to facilitate a practical implementation of (3.5),
we do the following. First, we can replace unknown γ with its consistent estimate γ̂ obtained from
selection equation (3.3) estimated in the first stage. Second, under the assumption of θr(·) being
sufficiently smooth, the unit for which ∆z′itγ ∼= 0 should also have θr,it ∼= θr,is. Thus, following
Kyriazidou’s (1997) idea, we can use data on the MFIs for which z′itγ̂ is “close” to z
′
isγ̂ (t 6= s)
and weigh these data on the basis of the “closeness” of ∆z′itγ̂ to 0. Intuitively, the cross-sectional
units, for which the self-selection likelihoods are close to being the same in both time periods t and
10That is, if F(ur,it, ur,is, vit, vis|ωr,i) = F(ur,is, ur,it, vis, vit|ωr,i) with F(·) being a multivariate joint distribution.
11Note that we could have obtained the same results under a much stronger assumption of (ur,it, vit) being inde-
pendently and identically distributed over both i and t. In that case, θr,it = E[ur,it|Dit = Dis = r (t 6= s)] =
E[ur,it|Dit = r (t 6= s)] = E[ur,it|vit > z′itγ if r = 1 or vit ≤ z′itγ if r = 2] ≡ θr(z′itγ), and it is easy to see that
θr,it = θr,is if z
′
itγ = z
′
isγ (t 6= s). However, the advantage of the “conditional exchangeability” assumption is that
it allows marginal distributions of errors (ur,it, vit) and hence the function θr(·) to vary over i.
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s (t 6= s), ought to be given heavier weights. Note that our approach somewhat differs from Ahn
& Powell’s (1993), who difference out sample selection bias by subtracting one cross-sectional unit
from another cross-sectional unit “matched” on the basis of similarity in their likelihoods of being
selected into the sample. In our paper, we eliminate the sample selection effect by “matching”
observations for the same cross-sectional unit across the two time periods, which allows us to also
purge the unknown unit-specific fixed effects.
Thus, for each MFI type r = 1, 2, we can consistently estimate the outcome equation of interest
in (3.4) along the lines of Kyriazidou (1997) from the following kernel-weighted first-differenced
least-squares problem based on any two time periods t and s( 6= t):
min
βr,Br
∑
i
[
∆ log(Cr,it)−∆ log(vr,it)′βr − 12∆vec{log(vr,it) log(vr,it)′}′vec{Br}
]2Dr,itK̂r,it, (3.7)
where Dr,it ≡ 1{Dr,it = Dr,is = r (t 6= s)} is an indicator variable selecting the same ith r-type unit
that has observations in both periods t and s( 6= t); and K̂r,it = k (∆z′itγ̂/h) is the kernel weight
with k(·) being a symmetric kernel function with the corresponding bandwidth parameter h → 0
slowly as N →∞. Letting ∆mr,it =
(
∆ log(vr,it)
′, 12∆vec{log(vr,it) log(vr,it)′}′
)′
, we then obtain a
semiparametric least-squares estimator of unknown βr and Br, i.e.,[
β̂r
vec{B̂r}
]
=
[∑
i
∆mr,it∆m
′
r,itDr,itK̂r,it
]−1 [∑
i
∆mr,it∆ log(Cr,it)Dr,itK̂r,it
]
. (3.8)
So long as the first-stage selection-equation estimator γ̂ converges at the rate faster than
N−2/5,12 the estimator in (3.8) is consistent and asymptotically normal with the asymptotic bias,
which results from the ∆z′itγ ∼= 0 approximation and goes to zero as h → 0 (Kyriazidou, 1997).
The bias can however be tackled via the bias-correction procedure. The convergence rate of the
(second-stage) estimator of βr and Br is expectedly slower than that of γ̂, namely N
−1/2+ν/2 with
1−2p < ν < p/2, where N−p is the convergence rate of γ̂, and the bandwidth is such that h ∝ N−ν .
In fact, we can maximize the convergence rate of
(
β̂
′
r, vec{B̂r}′
)′
by setting ν = 1/(τ+1), where τ is
the order of kernel function k(·), provided that γ is estimated fast enough, i.e., when p > τ/(2τ+1).
For more details, see Kyriazidou (1997).
Note that the above estimator makes use of two time periods only. However, in practice, panels
can extend well beyond T = 2. To make use of the entire data, one can estimate (3.8) for C(T, 2) =
T !
2!(T−2)! unique pairs of the time periods separately and then combine the obtained estimates of
unknown coefficients using some minimum distance measure. Naturally, for efficiency purposes,
it is preferable to combine such estimates using optimal weights which, in turn, necessitates the
estimation the covariance matrix of the estimators for different pairs of the time periods. However,
Charlier et al. (2001) show that the covariances between the estimators for different pairs of the
time periods converge to zero, and one therefore may combine the estimates simply using the
inverses of their corresponding variances as weights. Alternatively, the parameter estimates may be
merged via simple unweighted averaging, as for instance, suggested by Kyriazidou (1997). Another
practical way to go about having T > 2 is to stack all unique pairs of time periods together and
estimate (3.8) for each MFI type only once a la` Ahn & Powell (1993), which we do in this paper.
A few more remarks about the implementation of our estimator in (3.8).
First-Stage Estimation of γ. To ensure the fastest attainable convergence rate for the second-
stage estimator of cost functions, which are of the primary interest to our analysis, we employ Klein
12Naturally, with the parametric
√
N -rate being the upper bound.
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& Spady’s (1993) semiparametric single-index estimator for binary response models to estimate
selection equation (3.3) in the first stage. More concretely,
Pr[Dit = 1|χr,i] = Pr[vit > z′itγ|χr,i] = 1−F(z′itγ)
Pr[Dit = 2|χr,i] = Pr[vit ≤ z′itγ|χr,i] = F(z′itγ), (3.9)
where F(·) is an unspecified cdf of the random error vit which is estimated, along with the unknown
parameter vector γ, via (kernel-based) semiparametric maximum likelihood.
Our choice of this estimator for γ (over other available alternatives) has been primarily moti-
vated by two considerations. First, owing to its single-index treatment of zit, the estimator delivers
a parametric
√
N rate of convergence for γ̂, i.e., p = 1/2. When using the popular second-order
kernel function (τ = 2) in the second-stage estimation like we do, the latter facilitates the attain-
ment of the maximal rate of convergence for our main estimator in (3.8). Specifically, as discussed
earlier, condition p = 1/2 > τ/(2τ + 1) is satisfied when τ = 2, and we attain the familiar nonpara-
metric rate N−2/5 for
(
β̂
′
r, vec{B̂r}′
)′
. Second, Klein & Spady’s (1993) estimator does not require
the distributional assumption about vit thereby significantly reducing the risk of model misspecifi-
cation which, however, the alternative
√
N fully parametric estimators for binary response models
(such as the logit or probit) are inherently subject to. Alternative semiparametric binary-response
estimators such as Manski’s (1987) maximum score, Horowitz’s (1992) smoothed maximum score,
Khan’s (2013) sieve-based probit and Blevins & Khan’s (2013) local kernel-based probit estima-
tors, while also distribution-free, however converge at slower rates which fail to satisfy the desired
condition p > 2/5.13
Bias Reduction. We tackle the presence of asymptotic bias in estimator (3.8) by employing a
bias-reduction procedure which preserves the estimator’s maximal rate of convergence, as suggested
by Kyriazidou (1997). Specifically, consistent with our discussion above, let
(
β̂
′
r, vec{B̂r}′
)′
be the
estimator with bandwidth h ∝ N−ν such that ν = 1/(τ + 1), and (β˘′r, vec{B˘r}′)′ be the estimator
with bandwidth such that ν = δ/(τ + 1) where 0 < δ < 1. Then, the bias-corrected estimator of(
β′r, vec{Br}′
)′
is given by[
β˜r
vec{B˜r}
]
=
([
β̂r
vec{B̂r}
]
−N−(1−δ)τ/(2τ+1)
[
β˘r
vec{B˘r}
])/(
1−N−(1−δ)τ/(2τ+1)
)
(3.10)
and converges at the same rate as does the “un-corrected” estimator
(
β̂
′
r, vec{B̂r}′
)′
.
Bandwidth Selection. We select the optimal bandwidth for estimator (3.8) via a data-driven
leave-one-cross-section-out cross-validation a la` Malikov et al. (2016) meant to accommodate the
panel structure of the data. Specifically, for each MFI type r = 1, 2, we select the optimal bandwidth
by minimizing the following cross-validation objective function:
min
hr
∑
i
[
∆ log(Cr,it)−∆ log(vr,it)′β̂r,−i(hr)− 12∆vec{log(vr,it) log(vr,it)′}′vec{B̂r,−i(hr)}
]2Dr,it,
(3.11)
13To be concrete, their convergence rates are N−1/3 N−2/5, N−2/5 and N−1/3, respectively, although the convergence
rate of Horowitz’s (1992) estimator can be made arbitrarily close to N−1/2 by making a stronger assumption about
a higher degree of smoothness for the underlying distribution (and thereby using a higher-order kernel function).
13
where
(
β̂r,−i(hr)′, vec{B̂r,−i(hr)}′
)′
is the following leave-one-cross-section-out estimator of un-
known
(
β′r, vec{Br}′
)′
:
[
β̂r,−i(hr)
vec{B̂r,−i(hr)}
]
=
∑
j 6=i
∆mr,jt∆m
′
r,jtDr,jtK̂r,jt(hr)
−1 ∑
j 6=i
∆mr,jt∆ log(Cr,jt)Dr,jtK̂r,jt(hr)
 .
(3.12)
Note that, for notational consistency, both (3.11) and (3.12) are formulated for a single pair
of time periods t and s( 6= t). In the spirit of our earlier remarks, when T > 2 (like in our case),
multiple unique pairs of time periods can be accommodated by stacking them together and then
cross-validating the model for each MFI type only once.
4 Data
The unbalanced micro-level panel data on MFIs come from the Mixmarket database. Our data are
different from those previously analyzed in the literature in that we start with a larger proportion
of deposit-collecting MFIs. After data cleaning14 and given the availability of the matched country-
level variables used to control for external factors influencing MFIs’ output mix selection, the usable
sample contains the total of 4,692 observations on 1,003 MFIs from 76 countries during the 2004–
2014 period. The composition of the sample by MFI type is as follows: 45% loans-only and 55%
loans-and-savings MFIs. Also note that, unlike some previous studies, we are unable to distinguish
between compulsory and voluntary savings deposits and therefore use total savings in our analysis.
As discussed in Section 2, the outputs are the total loans (y1) and, if offered by an MFI, total
savings deposits (y2), both measured in thousands of real USD. The input prices are constructed as
follows. The price of labor w1 is the average annual wage measured in thousands of USD. The price
of physical capital (w2) is computed as the ratio of non-labor operating expenses to the number of
offices and thus is measured in thousands of USD per office/branch. The price of financial capital
(w3) is constructed by dividing the corresponding financial expenses by the borrowed funds and is
a unit-free interest rate. The total equity e (a quasi-fixed input) is the MFI’s equity in thousands of
real USD. Total variable cost (C), also measured in thousands of USD, is the sum of expenditures
on the three variable inputs. More specifically, we compute the variable cost as follows. First, from
the MFI’s total financial expense, which in its original form contains the expense on both borrowed
funds and deposits, we subtract the cost of deposits obtained by multiplying the volume of deposits
by the deposit (interest) rate reported by the Mixmarket. Next, we add the obtained (netted-out)
financial expense on non-deposit borrowed funds to the operating expense (on physical capital and
labor) to arrive at the restricted variable cost. Thus, the deposits are excluded from the variable
cost measure, consistent with labor, physical capital and borrowed (non-deposit) funds being the
three variable inputs to the production.15
14We remove observations with missing or negative values for cost, output quantities, input prices and the risk proxy.
We also drop few observations for which the ratio of loans delinquent by more than 30 days to the MFI’s total
portfolio (our risk proxy) exceeds one, since these are likely to be the result of erroneous data reporting. To
minimize the distortionary effects of outliers on the cost function estimates (and hence the estimates of the degree
of scope economies), we also exclude observations from the 1st and 99th percentiles of distributions of the variable
cost function covariates.
15We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we model microfinance technology using such a “restricted”
formulation of the variable cost function.
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Table 1. Data Summary Statistics
Variable 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu.
Loans-Only Loans-and-Savings
C 712.90 1,971.86 5,019.51 5,347.48 836.12 2,730.18 10,399.72 10,187.69
w1 6.14 10.03 10.87 14.33 3.74 7.54 8.98 13.08
w2 26.82 54.21 77.17 99.64 22.92 67.15 125.14 174.66
w3 7.37 10.21 11.50 13.40 5.03 6.97 7.83 9.62
e 906.54 2,489.58 6,293.26 7,016.12 831.33 2,841.91 11,265.29 10,619.91
y1 2,313.74 6,522.80 19,918.06 20,787.60 3,342.61 10,959.64 56,986.70 46,919.96
y2 — — — — 1,170.04 4,530.52 41,710.83 28,311.48
risk 0.008 0.028 0.047 0.058 0.018 0.042 0.060 0.080
Size 2,678.02 7,575.13 22,198.97 24,086.61 4,513.94 13,724.41 71,487.18 58,831.26
Non-Profit 0.613 0.527
Age: New 0.084 0.068
Age: Young 0.193 0.156
Age: Mature 0.723 0.776
Target Market: Broad 0.469 0.554
Target Market: High-End 0.029 0.066
Target Market: Low-End 0.487 0.330
Target Market: Small Business 0.015 0.050
GDP per capita 4.64 7.88 8.77 10.90 2.57 5.28 6.79 9.31
HDI 0.61 0.70 0.67 0.73 0.54 0.65 0.62 0.71
National Saving Rate 16.51 21.34 23.19 28.13 18.24 24.92 25.79 33.90
National Remittance Rate 2.10 4.21 7.52 9.99 1.86 3.74 6.38 9.83
Financial Sector Depth 32.22 44.68 51.59 69.72 32.35 40.85 45.28 58.97
Branches per 100,000 adults 7.16 11.00 16.79 19.63 5.06 7.67 12.94 14.00
Rural Population Share 26.25 43.03 42.92 60.62 35.88 53.27 51.62 69.41
Internet Subscription per 100 people 0.65 1.56 3.30 4.62 0.14 0.68 1.97 2.53
WGI: Control of Corruption –0.76 –0.51 –0.53 –0.29 –0.83 –0.68 –0.64 –0.40
WGI: Government Effectiveness –0.71 –0.39 –0.37 –0.05 –0.74 –0.49 –0.43 –0.11
WGI: Political Stability –0.98 –0.67 –0.67 –0.31 –1.33 –0.81 –0.85 –0.44
WGI: Rule of Law –0.86 –0.59 –0.55 –0.21 –0.90 –0.65 –0.64 –0.43
WGI: Regulatory Quality –0.46 –0.28 –0.19 0.23 –0.66 –0.34 –0.34 –0.11
WGI: Voice and Accountability –0.59 –0.11 –0.21 0.15 –0.45 –0.14 –0.23 0.09
% Obs. 44.88 55.12
C – total variable costs; w1 – price of labor; w2 – price of physical capital; w3 – price of financial capital; e – total equity; y1 – total loans,
y2 – total savings deposits; risk – portfolio at risk (30 days). Variables C, y1, y2, y3, w1, w2, e, size and GDP per capita are in thousands of
real USD. Variable w3, National Saving and Remittance Rates, Financial Sector Depth and Rural Population Share are in % points. The risk
variable is a unit-free proportion. The HDI and WGI indices are unit-free (for more details, see their original sources).
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We also condition the estimated variable cost functions on a measure of credit risk (risk). Like
for any other financial institution, credit risk is an important factor for MFIs which, following the
tradition in the literature, we proxy using the information on non-performing loans. It is imperative
to account for such a risk when modeling the cost structure of financial institutions because lower-
quality assets (reflected in a higher non-performing loans ratio) generally require more resources
to manage a higher-level risk exposure thereby raising the costs for MFIs. Failure to account for
riskiness/quality of loans may therefore produce misleading results (e.g., see Hughes & Mester,
2013). In this paper, we proxy the level of risk that an MFI is exposed to via the ratio of loans
delinquent by more than 30 days to the MFI’s total portfolio, which is a unit-free proportion.
We next proceed to discussion of the variables entering the output mix selection equation. Here,
we seek to control for factors that may potentially affect the MFI’s endogenous decision to operate
as a loans-only or a loans-and-savings institution. The vector z includes covariates capturing both
internal and external factors that may influence the MFI’s propensity to offer savings accounts as
an additional financial service to their customers. The internal (MFI-specific) factors include (i)
age of the MFI captured via three dummy variables (New for age less than 4 year, Y oung for age
between 4 and 8 years and Mature for age above eight years),16 (ii) the non-profit status indicator,
(iii) size of the MFI defined as the total value of its portfolio and measured in thousands of USD,
and (iv) four dummies for the target market: Low End, High End, Broad and Small Businesses.
The latter categories are defined based on the poverty level of target customers using the “depth
of clientele” ratio of average loan balance per borrower to the country’s GNI per capita. The “low-
end”, “broad”, “high-end” and “small business” target market categories respectively correspond to
the depth ratio of less than 20% or the average loan size being less than $150, 20–149%, 150–250%
and above 250%.
We also include the following external (country-specific) factors, the data on which we obtain
from the World Bank’s World Development and Worldwide Governance Indicators database as
well as from the United Nations Development Programme: (i) GDP per capita (ii) national saving
rate, (iii) national remittance rate, (iv) a measure of the depth of financial sector, (v) the number
of branches per 100,000 adults, (vi) the share of rural population, (vii) the broadband internet
subscription per 100 people, (viii) six governance indicators measuring institutional quality in the
country including control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law,
regulatory quality and voice and accountability, and (ix) the human development index (HDI). In
what follows, we describe each of these variables.
We include GDP per capita, in thousands of PPP-adjusted USD, to proxy for level of economic
activity in the country. The national gross savings rate, the ratio of total savings to GNI, captures
population’s willingness to save and thus availability of savings that an MFI can collect. The ratio of
total remittances to GDP is included because significant remittances from abroad necessitate the use
of savings accounts thereby making adoption of the loans-and-savings output mix more attractive
for MFIs. The depth of financial sector is defined as the ratio of the M2 monetary aggregate,
including currency and deposits, to the country’s GDP and measures the level of banking sector
development. It captures how difficult/easy it is to collect deposits from marginalized clients. In a
similar vein, the number of branches per 100,000 people reflects the “density” of banking services
in the country. The share of rural population is the proportion of the country’s total population
living in rural areas. The self-selection of MFIs into deposit-taking is likely to be influenced by
transaction costs associated with distance and the lack of infrastructure in less urbanized regions,
which directly affect the cost of serving the rural poor. Hence, we include the rural population
share variable in the selection equation to proxy for the latter. Since many microfinance services
16Unfortunately, no continuous measure of the MFI’s age is available in the Mixmarket database.
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Table 2. Cost Elasticity of Deposits in the
Loans-and-Savings MFIs
Point One-Sided
Estimate Lower Bound
10th Percentile 0.024 –0.047
1st Quartile 0.052 –0.006
Median 0.084 0.041
3rd Quartile 0.119 0.077
90th Percentile 0.148 0.109
Mean 0.085 0.041
Reported are the estimates of ∂ log C/∂ log y2 from
the translog C (w, e, y1, y2) function with C being
a sum of expenses on x less the cost of deposits.
The lower bounds are for the one-sided 95% per-
centile block-bootstrap confidence intervals, with
the corresponding upper bounds being +∞.
Figure 1. Distribution of Cost Elasticity of
Deposits in the Loans-and-Savings MFIs
rely on wireless technology to mobilize deposits, especially in remote area (e.g., cell phone mobile
banking), the level of internet subscription in the country is also included in the selection equation.
Lastly, in light of growing evidence of the importance of institutions for both the overall economic
development and the performance of individual organizations, we condition the MFI’s output mix
choice on several measures of institutional quality and human development (e.g., Eicher & Leukert,
2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Yasar et al., 2011). Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the
variables used in the analysis.
5 Empirical Results
Deposits as Outputs. We first assess the empirical validity of treating deposits as an output to
the microfinance production. Specifically, motivated by Hughes & Mester’s (1993) arguments, we
verify the output-like role of microdeposits empirically by estimating a variable cost function for
loans-and-savings MFIs, which we condition on the level/quantity of savings deposits with their
costs subtracted from the financial expenditures entering the left-hand-side cost variable, and then
formally testing the sign of cost (log)derivative with respect to the level of deposits. A positive
sign would indicate that deposits are an output, whereas a negative sign would indicate that they
are an input in the production process.17
Table 2 summarizes point estimates of the cost elasticity of deposits obtained from the first-
difference estimator of C (w, e, y1, y2) for loans-and-savings MFIs using the translog specification
subject to the Slutsky symmetry and linear homogeneity in w.18 The point estimates are positive
17We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight; also, see Braeutigam & Daughety (1983).
18Here and in what follows, when estimating cost functions, we also include a credit risk proxy, the time trend (along
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for 96% of observations, as can also be seen in Figure 1 which plots the histogram of these elasticity
estimates. The average estimate is 0.085, and it is statistically positive at the conventional level.
Namely, its one-sided 95% bootstrap lower bound clustered at the MFI level is 0.041 (see Table
2) which is well above zero thereby letting us reject the null in favor of the “>0” alternative.
We formally test for the variable cost elasticity of deposits being positive at each observation and
find it to be (one-sidedly) statistically greater than zero for two thirds of the sample (68%). We
also perform additional tests of similar fashion applied to the non-interest variable cost function
estimated treating all financial assets—deposits and other borrowed capital—as quasi-fixed with the
left-hand-side variable cost measuring operational expenses on labor and physical capital only. The
results are reassuring, with the non-interest cost elasticity of deposits being statistically positive
for 90% of observations (for more details, see Appendix A). Thus, we find strong empirical evidence
in support of the output-like treatment of microdeposits.
Complementarity of Deposits and Loans. Before proceeding to our main analysis of scope
(dis)economies in the industry, as a preliminary investigation we examine the extent of output
complementarity in the integrated loans-and-savings microfinance production. Following Baumol
et al. (1982), such a complementarity is said to exist when, owing to “positive synergies,” an
increase in the level of one output leads to a decline in the marginal cost of another output (also
see Chavas & Kim, 2010). In our context, the latter is equivalent to the condition that the variable
cost function for loans-and-savings MFIs be such that ∂2C(·)/∂y1∂y2 < 0. It is informative to
investigate this complementary between deposits and loans because, if present, it would be one of
the sources of positive scope economies in integrated MFIs.
We recover cross-output derivatives of the loans-and-savings variable cost function in levels from
the already estimated translog specification of C (w, e, y1, y2) in logs from above as follows:
∂2C(·)
∂y1∂y2
=
(
∂2 ln C(·)
∂ ln y1∂ ln y2
+
∂ ln C(·)
∂ ln y1
∂ ln C(·)
∂ ln y2
)
× C
y1y2
, (5.1)
where the obtained second-order cross-partial is observation-specific, and its sign is governed by the
sign of estimated term in parentheses. Table 3 reports the summary of point estimates of this cross-
output cost derivative. The sample mean and median estimates are both statistically negative at
the conventional level, but the two values visibly diverge (–2.75 and –0.058, respectively) owing to
an expectedly strong positive skew in the C/(y1y2) term. Figure 2 scatter-plots point estimates of
the same cross-output cost derivative scaled back by the inverse of C/(y1y2) to remove skewness.
19
The figure also plots the one-sided 95% upper percentile bootstrap bound (solid line) for each
observation-level estimate, which we have sorted by the bound as well as color-coded depending
on if it is statistically negative or not. Formally testing for the cross-output cost derivate being
less than zero at each observation, we find that it is (one-sidedly) statistically negative for 40.3%
of the sample only. This empirical evidence suggests that complementarity between loans and
microdeposits is not exhibited uniformly across all integrated MFIs. The latter however does not
necessarily imply that technological conditions for substantive economies of scope in the industry
are lacking, since output complementarity is only one of potential sources of scope economies
when defined as in (2.6) allowing for partial specialization a` la Evans & Heckman (1984). Other
sources of scope-driven cost savings include scale economies, effects of the cost convexity as well as
discontinuities between heterogeneous loans-only and loans-and-savings cost functions. For more on
with its expansion terms) meant to accommodate temporal shifts in the cost frontiers as well as allow for shifts
during and after the 2008 financial crisis.
19Effectively, plotted is the term appearing inside parentheses in (5.1).
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Table 3. Cross-Output Cost Derivative in the
Loans-and-Savings MFIs (×105)
Point One-Sided
Estimate Upper Bound
10th Percentile –2.927 –0.969
1st Quartile –0.463 –0.090
Median –0.058 –0.001
3rd Quartile –0.004 0.030
90th Percentile 0.001 0.220
Mean –2.750 –0.992
Reported are the estimates of ∂2C/∂y1∂y2 × 105
recovered from the translog C (w, e, y1, y2) func-
tion. The upper bounds are for the one-sided
95% percentile block-bootstrap confidence inter-
vals, with the corresponding lower bounds being
−∞.
Figure 2. The One-Sided 95% Percentile
Block-Bootstrap Upper Bounds (Solid Line)
of the Cross-Output Cost Derivative
Estimates (Scatter Points) in the
Loans-and-Savings MFIs, scalled by y1y2C
necessary and sufficient conditions for and the decomposition of economies of scope (also sometimes
referred to as economies of diversification) defined in a fashion analogous to that of our paper, see
Chavas & Kim (2010). Therefore, to comprehensively assess the prevalence of scope economies in
the industry, we proceed to the estimation of our main model and the direct measurement of the
degree of scope economies in the microfinance production.
Endogenously Heterogeneous Technologies. We estimate endogenously switching heteroge-
neous cost functions in (3.1)–(3.3) subject to not only the linear homogeneity in input prices and
the Slutsky symmetry but also the monotonicity regularity conditions in order to ensure that our
results are economically meaningful because, to paraphrase Barnett (2002, p.199), without theo-
retical regularity conditions imposed, the conditions for optimal behavior may fail prompting the
duality to also fail making the policy and value functions (such as the cost function) become in-
valid.20 The linear homogeneity property is imposed by dividing the cost and input prices by one
of the three input prices, the choice of which the model is invariant to. We use the price of labor
w1 as a normalizing input price. The imposition of the Slutsky symmetry is trivial. We impose
the positive monotonicity of Cr(·) [and hence of log(Cr(·)) which we actually estimate in practice]
in output quantities, input prices and risk and the negative monotonicity in quasi-fixed input by
“tilting” our estimator in (3.8) using the procedure proposed by Hall & Huang (2001) and further
extended by Du et al. (2013). The procedure essentially mutes or magnifies the impact of any given
20On the importance of incorporating economic theory in the econometric measurement, also see Barnett et al. (1991),
Heckman & Serletis (2014, 2015) and Serletis & Feng (2015).
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Table 4. First-Stage Estimates of the Selection Equation
Coefficient Two-Sided Two-Sided Median
Covariate Estimate Lower Bound Upper Bound Marginal Effect
Non-Profit –1.0000 — — –0.5060
Age: Young 0.0544 0.0376 0.0667 0.0275
Age: Mature 0.0546 0.0359 0.0671 0.0276
Broad Target Market –0.1710 –0.1931 –0.1562 –0.0865
High-End Target Market –0.1653 –0.2593 –0.1507 –0.0836
Low-End Target Market –0.2154 –0.2419 –0.2062 –0.1090
log(Size) 0.0039 0.0016 0.0057 0.0020
log(GDP per capita) –0.3543 –0.3790 –0.3424 –0.1793
HDI –0.8077 –0.9072 –0.7167 –0.4087
Gross Saving Rate 0.0059 0.0054 0.0069 0.0030
Depth of Financial Sector 0.0004 0.0001 0.0007 0.0002
Share of Rural Population 0.0277 0.0268 0.0284 0.0140
Remittances-to-GDP Ratio –0.0049 –0.0059 –0.0039 –0.0025
Branches per 100K people –0.0058 –0.0064 –0.0054 –0.0029
Internet Subscription per 100 people 0.0119 0.0094 0.0138 0.0060
WGI: Control of Corruption –0.1674 –0.1973 –0.1471 –0.0847
WGI: Government Effectiveness 0.2801 0.2518 0.3177 0.1417
WGI: Political Stability –0.1526 –0.1615 –0.1458 –0.0772
WGI: Rule of Law –0.3224 –0.3418 –0.2930 –0.1631
WGI: Regulatory Quality 0.0269 0.0123 0.0473 0.0136
WGI: Voice and Accountability 0.1005 0.0844 0.1115 0.0509
Financial Crisis Year –0.0054 –0.0184 –0.0005 –0.0027
Post-Financial Crisis Period 0.0111 0.0051 0.0237 0.0056
For identification, the Non-Profit coefficient is normalized to negative unity. The two middle columns report the
two-sided 95% percentile block-bootstrap confidence bounds. New, for-profit MFIs targeting small businesses
in the pre-financial crisis period are the reference group.
data point used in the estimation by reweighing observations so that the regularity conditions are
satisfied at each data point. This allows us to impose the monotonicity restrictions post-estimation
via a quadratic programming technique (for more details, see Appendix B).
To empirically assess sensitivity of the results to controlling for endogenous self-selection of MFIs
into either of the two types of institutions (loans-only and loans-and-savings), we also estimate an
alternative model whereby heterogeneous cost functions in (3.1)–(3.2) are fitted while completely
ignoring the technology selection process in (3.3). In this case, to guarantee as much compara-
bility across the models as possible, the cost functions are estimated via simple first-difference
least-squares estimator. Essentially, this alternative model estimates heterogeneous microfinance
technologies under the rather strong assumption of exogenous/ignorable selection. Comparing the
results across the two models allows us to examine the degree to which the technological estimates
such as scope and scale economies may get distorted as a result of the potential model misspecifi-
cation due to the ignored endogenous self-selection of MFIs.
We begin by briefly discussing the first-stage estimates of the MFI-type selection equation
described in (3.3) and (3.9). Table 4 reports estimates of the γ coefficient parameters along with
their two-sided 95% block-bootstrap percentile confidence intervals from Klein & Spady’s (1993)
semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator. For identification purposes, the coefficient in front
of one of the covariates (the Non-Profit indicator, in our case) is normalized to negative unity.21
Also, to account for potential short- and long-lasting structural changes in the microfinance industry
21The identification also requires the presence of at least one continuous covariate among zit: we have multiple.
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in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, in addition to the z variables described in Section 4,
we also include dummies for the year 2008 and the 2008-onward period.22 The model has a good
fit with the correct classification ratio (using the 0.5 threshold) being equal to 0.78 overall and 0.81
and 0.73 by loans-only and loans-and-savings choice outcome. Further note that, unlike traditional
parametric binary-choice models (probit or logit), semiparametric single-index models like the one
we employ in this paper do not impose monotonicity on unknown F(·) since they assume no
particular distribution. The latter implies that the sign of estimated coefficients does not necessarily
coincide with the sign of marginal effects of covariates at each observation. This however poses no
problem for us since the sole purpose of the first-stage estimation is to facilitate a selection-bias
correction during the (second-stage) estimation of cost functions which are of primary interest to
us. To facilitate interpretation, we therefore report the median marginal effects of covariates on the
conditional propensity to select the loans-and-savings MFI type (see the last column in Table 4).
The results show that all selection variables are statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, we find
that the deposit-collecting MFIs tend to be for-profit and larger in size, possibly because obtaining
a license to collect savings deposits is associated with the size entry barriers that larger for-profit
entities are more likely to satisfy. We find that, relative to the reference group of new MFIs (less
than 3 years in operation), older MFIs classified as “young” and “mature” are more likely to collect
savings but the median partial effect on the probability is only 3% which is quite timid. We also
find that loans-and-savings MFIs are less likely to target poorer clients. More concretely, consistent
with the view that it is difficult to meet the savings needs of a poorer clientele, the median MFIs
targeting borrowers other than the largest client group of small businesses (our reference group)
are found to be 8–11% less likely to self-select into offering savings. Deposit-collecting MFIs are
also less likely to operate in richer countries and countries with higher levels of human development
plausibly because, in less developed countries, the marginalized clients have a higher demand for the
savings services from institutions like MFIs due to being under-served by more traditional financial
intermediaries such as commercial banks. This interpretation is supported by our results whereby
the deposit-collecting MFIs are more likely to operate in countries with higher proportions of rural
population and fewer bank branches per 100K people. While remittances have been a big target and
motivation for MFIs to start offering savings deposits and payment services, the empirical results
show that the deposit-collecting MFIs are more likely to operate in countries with lower remittance
rates. It is therefore possible that regular commercial banks have already captured the remittances
flows. At the same time, the positive link to a higher internet subscription density suggests that
MFIs have maintained an edge in the innovative technology to reach rural borrowers. We also find
that the institutional environment matters significantly for the MFIs’ ability to collect deposits.
Finally, we find a positive but small partial effect on the selection propensity in the years following
the financial crisis which suggests that, after the financial crisis (which is estimated to have had a
negative effect in its peak year of 2008), MFIs were more likely to be loans-and-savings rather than
loans-only. This is however likely due to the already existing trend toward commercialization and
transformation in the industry rather than due to the financial crisis itself. These results attest to
the timeliness of our work for policy considerations because all previous studies of scope economies
derive their findings from the older pre-crisis data. In what follows, we now focus on the main
results of our paper concerning technological metrics of microfinance.
We also examine the second-stage translog parameter estimates (omitted to conserve space) of
the variable cost functions for loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs, with and without selection.
Overall, the results suggest two findings. First, the cost parameters are non-negligibly heteroge-
22As footnoted earlier, these dummies are also included in the outcome equations (in addition to the time trend along
with its expansion terms which are meant to allow for continuous temporal shifts in the cost frontiers).
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Table 5. Returns to Scale Estimates
Point Estimates Categories, %
Model Mean 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. DRS NDRS CRS NCRS IRS NIRS
Loans-Only
With Selection 1.552 1.425 1.536 1.650 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 0.00
(1.506, 1.608) (1.390, 1.482) (1.491, 1.590) (1.591, 1.733)
Without Selection 1.738 1.446 1.678 1.941 0.00 100.00 0.43 99.57 99.67 0.33
(1.648, 1.852) (1.384 1.514) (1.597, 1.757) (1.824, 2.089)
Loans-and-Savings
With Selection 1.601 1.397 1.561 1.771 0.00 100.00 0.46 99.54 99.61 0.39
(1.529, 1.681) (1.335, 1.466) (1.495, 1.630) (1.658, 1.887)
Without Selection 1.906 1.549 1.805 2.154 0.00 100.00 0.50 99.50 99.57 0.43
(1.727, 2.105) (1.408, 1.693) (1.620, 1.970) (1.902, 2.383)
The left panel summarizes RTS point estimates with the corresponding two-sided 95% percentile block-bootstrap confidence intervals in parentheses.
Each MFI is classified as exhibiting decreasing/constant/increasing returns to scale (DRS/CRS/IRS) if the point estimate of its returns to scale is
statistically less than/equal to/greater than one at the 5% significance level using appropriate one- or two-sided percentile confidence bounds. The right
panel reports sample shares for each category and for its corresponding negating alternative: non-decreasing/non-constant/non-increasing returns to
scale (NDRS/NCRS/NIRS), respectively. Percentage points sum up to a hundred within binary groups only.
neous across loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs thereby buttressing our concerns about the
validity of assumption that MFIs share the same production technology regardless of their output
mixes embedded in a popular single-equation approach to modeling cost relationships for MFIs.
We formally test the null of non-heterogeneous cost functions across the two types of MFIs via the
cross-equation multiple-restriction Wald test on the parameters of common regressors in (3.1)–(3.2)
and strongly reject the null in favor of heterogeneous cost functions with the block-bootstrap p-
value of 4×10−6, when the endogenous technology selection is being controlled for, and the p-value
of 0.002, when selectivity is ignored. Thus, the data strongly indicate that it is more appropriate
to model different cost functions for loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs not only to avoid the
“log-of-zero” problem but, more importantly, to allow for potential parameter instability and dis-
continuities across MFI-type-specific cost functions. The second finding concerns the importance
of explicitly controlling for MFIs’ endogenous selection of the output mix and, by extension, of
the appropriate microfinance technology. Rather expectedly, we find that the failure to account
for selectivity is capable of significantly distorting the results: the non-negligibly overestimated
returns to scale, as is evident from Table 5, are perhaps the most exemplary of such distortions.
Here, we use the measure of returns to scale that takes into account quasi-fixity of the equity
input (Caves et al., 1981): RTS = (1 − ∂ logCr/∂ log e)/
∑
m ∂ logCr/∂ log ym. While the results
reported in Table 5 are qualitatively similar, overwhelmingly pointing to statistically significant
increasing returns to scale for all MFIs, the quantitative magnitude of untapped potential for
scale-driven cost reduction is however significantly overestimated when one does not control for
self-selection among institutions. Generally, such cost savings are attributed to fixed costs being
spread over more units of output as MFIs radially expand the scale of their operation, which leads
to a decline in the cost per unit of output. However, we would like to emphasize that such scale-
driven cost savings are being measured for a given output mix and exclude any other potential cost
reduction associated with the provision of a more diversified output mix. As discussed in Section
2.2, to measure the latter cost saving potential, we look at the degree of scope economies in MFIs.
We formally test the null of exogenous output mix selection among MFIs. The Hausman-type
test based on the distance between the first-difference least-squares estimator (ignoring selection)
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Table 6. Degree of Scope Economies Estimates
Point Estimates Categories, %
Model Mean 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. SD SND SI SNI SE SNE
With Selection 0.072 –0.041 0.056 0.169 13.46 86.54 50.27 49.73 45.59 54.41
(0.001, 0.119) (–0.148, 0.024) (–0.022, 0.085) (0.101, 0.196)
Without Selection 0.152 0.043 0.108 0.219 0.00 100.00 41.76 58.24 69.53 30.47
(0.086, 0.189) (–0.015, 0.063) (0.034, 0.141) (0.150, 0.279)
The left panel summarizes DGSE point estimates with the corresponding two-sided 95% percentile block-bootstrap confidence intervals in parentheses.
Each MFI is classified as exhibiting scope diseconomies/invariance/economies (SD/SI/SE) if its point estimate of DGSE is statistically less than/equal
to/greater than zero at the 5% significance level using appropriate one- or two-sided percentile confidence bounds. The right panel reports sample shares
for each category and for its corresponding negating alternative: scope non-diseconomies/non-invariance/non-economies (SND/SNI/SNE), respectively.
Percentage points sum up to a hundred within binary groups only.
and Kyriazidou’s (1997) estimator (controlling for selection) decisively rejects the null of ignorable
selection with block-bootstrap p-values being no larger than 10−4 for both loans-only and loans-
and-savings MFIs. Failure to accommodate this endogenous selectivity is therefore likely to lead to
biased and inconsistent estimates of technological metrics for MFIs and thus misleading conclusions
about the industry.
Degree of Scope (Dis)Economies. To measure the degree of scope economies for individual
MFIs, which is a main focus of our paper, we use the fitted MFI-type-specific variable cost functions
(from the two models: with and without selection). As discussed in Section 2, since our measure
of the degree of within-sample scope economies (DSE) depends on the distribution [controlled by
the choice of the $ weight] of a more diversified loans-and-savings MFI’s output quantities across
more specialized production units, we employ a conservative approach to measuring the degree of
scope economies by focusing on the smallest DSE estimates in the data-defined admissible region.
Specifically, for each loans-and-savings MFI in a given year, we perform a grid search (over $) of
the lowest value of DSE. The grid search is performed over the permissible range of $ between 0
and 1 at the 0.01 increments. We refer to the located smallest DSE estimate as the measure of the
degree of MFI’s “global” scope economies, i.e., DGSE. The reported DGSE estimates are obtained
using actual data for the multi-output loans-and-savings MFIs which gives us the distribution of
estimates for the entire industry.
The point estimates of the degree of “global” scope economies DGSE from two models are sum-
marized in Table 6, the right panel of which also breakdowns MFIs into three main categories—scope
diseconomies, scope invariance and scope economies (SD/SI/SE)—each of which has a negating al-
ternative: scope non-diseconomies, scope non-invariance and scope non-economies (SND/SNI/SNE),
respectively. The classification into these three binary groups is performed on the basis of a DGSE
point estimate being statistically less than/equal to/greater than zero at the 5% significance level
using appropriate one- or two-sided percentile bootstrap confidence bounds. More concretely, given
the “less than” (“greater than”) definition of scope diseconomies (economies), an MFI is classified
as exhibiting significantly negative scope diseconomies (positive scope economies) if its one-sided
95% upper (lower) bound is less (greater) than zero; if not, an MFI is said to exhibit scope non-
diseconomies (non-economies). In the case of scope invariance, the notion of which is based on
the “equal to” definition, an MFI is classified as exhibiting invariance to scope if its two-sided
95% confidence interval contains zero; if not, it is said to show significant scope non-invariance.
Clearly, the SD/SI/SE categorization is not mutually exclusive by construction.23 For a graphical
23The assignment into one of the three SD/SI/SE categories and their corresponding negating alternative—
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Figure 3. Distribution of the Degree of Scope Economies Estimates
summary of the results, also see Figure 3 which plots cross-validated kernel densities of the DGSE
point estimates across individual loans-and-savings MFIs.
Based on our preferred model, which controls for the endogenous selection of output mix/scope,
we find that, at the median, the microfinance production technology largely exhibits invariance to
scope of outputs produced, with the median estimate of the degree of scope economies at statis-
tically insignificant –0.06. In contrast, the median estimate from the alternative model that fails
to correct for endogenous self-selection is positive and statistically significant, pointing to non-
negligible economies of scope at around 0.11. However, the median point estimates may be rather
uninformative because they mask heterogeneity across individual institutions the presence of which
can be vividly seen from the empirical distribution of the DGSE estimates in Figure 3. The figure
indicates that a third of microfinance industry (32%) is comprised of the institutions with negative
point estimates of the degree of scope economies. Indeed, we find that, after controlling for endoge-
nous selection, only 46% of loans-and-savings MFIs in our sample enjoy significantly positive scope
economies. More importantly, for a non-trivial 14% of institutions, the empirical evidence suggests
the existence of significant diseconomies of scope indicating that the separate production of loans
and savings accounts has the potential to reduce an MFI’s costs. For concreteness, the mean DGSE
value for these multi-output MFIs is a sizable –0.21 implying, on average, the potential for a 21%
cost saving if the joint production of loans and savings is replaced with two single-output MFIs.
Note that the presence of such scope diseconomies however in no way implies cost inefficiency or
sub-optimality on the part of these multi-output MFIs. Neither does it suggest that these MFIs
may not reduce their costs by scaling up their operations to capitalize on (universally) significant
scale economies.24 It does however suggest that it may be inappropriate to invoke scope economies
SND/SNI/SNE, respectively—is however mutually exclusive.
24As mentioned earlier, the increasing returns to scale are in fact a contributor to positive economies of scope (see
Chavas & Kim, 2010). This is readily seen from our definition of scope economies in (2.6) where the magnitudes
of y1 used in the construction of a counterfactual sum of C1(·) and C2(·) on the left-hand side are the scaled-down
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Figure 4. The One-Sided 95% Percentile Block-Bootstrap Lower and Upper Bounds (Solid Lines)
of the Degree of Scope Economies Estimates (Scatter Points) [Note: DGSE < 0 and DGSE > 0
are in red and blue, respectively]
as a justification for a universal expansion of the scope of financial operations by MFIs. That is, it
may be ill-advised to urge loans-only MFIs to start offering savings accounts to their customer base
unconditionally on the grounds of potential cost savings due to the expanded scope of services.
After all, scope economies are significantly positive for less than a half of MFIs only, although
with the average value estimated at a non-negligible 0.23. For 50% of loans-and-saving MFIs, the
operating costs exhibit scope invariance as indicated by statistically insignificant degree of scope
economies estimates (see Table 6).
The above findings from our preferred model differ from those based on the alternative model,
which takes the selectivity issue for granted. More specifically, from Figure 3, it is easy to see that
the failure to account for selection leads to the overestimation of degree of scope economies for
MFIs, with the entire DGSE distribution visibly shifted to the right. As a result, the number of
MFIs for which one finds significantly negative scope economies is misleadingly decreased to none
at all with the overwhelming majority of institutions (70%) said to be exhibiting significant scope
shares of y1 used on the right-hand side. Hence, the presence of scale economies would be one of the factors
contributing to a positive gap between the left- and right-hand sides of inequality.
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economies. Figure 4 vividly illustrates tendency of the alternative model to overestimate (as a result
of ignoring the output scope selection) the magnitude of scope economies in the industry with a
consequent mischaracterization of microfinancing technology. The figure scatter-plots the degree
of scope economies (DGSE) estimates for each MFI-year along with their one-sided 95% lower
and upper percentile bootstrap bounds (solid lines) from the two models, based on which the right
panel of Table 6 is partly populated. The observation-level estimates are sorted by their confidence
bounds and color-coded depending on whether they are above/below zero or not. The estimated
one-sided intervals are visibly shifted upwards if the endogenous selection is left unaccounted for
and, as a result, many MFIs are misleadingly classified as enjoying significantly positive scope
economies: 70% of institutions against 46% as suggested by our more robust preferred model.
Our selection-corrected results differ from those previously reported in Delgado et al. (2015)
who document the 10% scope economies in the industry overall. In fact, they find that as many
as 65% of MFIs in their sample exhibit statistically significant scope economies leading them to
conclude that the industry generally enjoys scope-driven cost savings, which significantly differs
from our conclusions. Our findings also differ from those by Hartarska et al. (2011) who too
generally find empirical support for positive scope economies in the industry with the statistically
significant median estimate of 19%. They also hardly find any evidence of diseconomies of scope
among MFIs with most of their reported negative estimates being statistically insignificant instead
suggesting scope invariance,25 whereas we find that the MFIs with significantly negative scope
diseconomies actually constitute a non-negligible 14% of the microfinance industry. Furthermore,
based on Hartarska et al.’s (2011) estimates, the institutions that do have statistically significant
scope economies enjoy much larger (almost trice as large) scope-driven cost savings than what
we find in this paper. It is noteworthy however that these previous studies do not control for
endogenous self-selection of MFIs and nor do they estimate separate cost functions to allow for
(discontinuous) technological heterogeneity across the specialized and more integrated MFIs.26
Instead, prior studies usually accommodate the heterogeneity across MFIs by including control
variables directly in the cost function common to all MFIs. Such an approach leads to qualitatively
different implications of controlling for the MFI heterogeneity whereby adding controls leads to an
increase in the magnitude of scope economies resulting in a rightward shift of the distribution of their
estimates. That is, in previous studies, the estimated degree of scope diseconomies becomes smaller
(in absolute value) and the degree of scope economies becomes larger when controls are included in
the model. In contrast, controlling for (endogenous) technological heterogeneity across MFIs using
our approach shifts the estimates of degree of scope economies to the left: they becomes smaller in
magnitude with a much larger share of them being significantly negative (see Figures 3–4).
Next, we provide a more in-depth analysis of our findings about scope (dis)economies in the
industry based on the results from our preferred model of endogenously heterogeneous technologies.
We begin by examining the evolution of scope (dis)economies over time, which is of particular
interest given that our sample period includes both the pre- and post-financial-crisis years. In Table
7, we document yearly changes in the breakdown of MFIs exhibiting (statistically significant) scope
economies and diseconomies along with their corresponding mean DGSE estimates. Up until 2008,
the share of MFIs with significantly positive scope economies had been on the rise with a half (52%)
of the deposit-collecting MFIs experiencing substantial economies of scope, on average, of about
23% scope-driven cost reduction. The arrival of the global financial crisis appears to have reversed
25While Hartarska et al. (2011) do not report shares of MFIs with scope economies/invariance/diseconomies, the
statistical significance or insignificance of the quartile estimates of scope economies that they report suggests that
only few, if not none at all, MFIs exhibits scope diseconomies.
26Prior studies also do not impose theoretical regularity conditions on the estimated technology like we do.
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Table 7. Scope (Dis)Economies over Time
Scope Economies (SE) Scope Diseconomies (SD)
Year % Obs Mean Est. % Obs Mean Est.
2004 34.67 0.287 26.67 –0.246
2005 40.37 0.280 22.36 –0.218
2006 48.99 0.311 17.81 –0.225
2007 50.76 0.269 16.41 –0.220
2008 52.37 0.231 15.88 –0.208
2009 46.40 0.211 14.40 –0.195
2010 45.71 0.204 11.96 –0.196
2011 45.75 0.162 8.82 –0.191
2012 47.18 0.164 4.62 –0.186
2013 33.12 0.151 3.82 –0.189
2014 8.93 0.117 3.57 –0.164
2004–2014 45.59 0.225 13.46 –0.209
The estimates are from our preferred model of heterogeneous technolo-
gies with selectivity. The “scope economies” and “scope diseconomies”
categories are respectively based on whether DGSE point estimates are
statistically greater or less than zero.
this trend. Since then, the average magnitude of (significantly positive) scope economies has been
steadily decreasing and was only 12% in 2014. The share of MFIs exhibiting these significant
scope economies has declined as well, to 33% in 2013 with a consequent collapse to mere 9% in
2014. Meanwhile, the proportion of MFIs exhibiting significantly negative scope diseconomies has
also been shrinking steadily throughout the years (from 27 to 4% of the industry) reinforced by
a simultaneous decline in the absolute magnitude of such scope diseconomies from 25% to 16%.
These findings suggest that many deposit-collecting MFIs, which might used to enjoy positive
scope economies, may have since seen them erode following the turbulent times of turmoil in
global financial markets. Also, the MFIs that have entered the deposit collection only recently,
post the financial crisis, may not have the advantages of earlier entrants. Thus, with the rapidly
declining shares of institutions exhibiting both the economies and diseconomies of scope, the cost
structure of more and more MFIs appears to have generally become invariant to scope (i.e., they
have statistically insignificant DGSE estimates). Figure 5 provides a convenient illustration of
these industry trends across all MFIs, those with statistically significant and insignificant (positive
and negative) DGSE point estimates. The pictured box-plot of the distribution of DGSE point
estimates across the years tells a familiar story, consistent with the already documented findings,
whereby the microfinance industry has experienced a notable reversal in the pre-crisis upward trend
in the magnitude of scope economies accompanied by the growing dominance of near-zero estimates
in the last years of the sample period.
To systemically analyze how the magnitude of scope (dis)economies varies across different insti-
tutions, we estimate several regressions of the degree of scope economies on attributes of MFIs (also
see Berger et al., 2000). The results are reported in Table 8. The first column reports the results
from a simple OLS regression where the left-hand-side variable is the DGSE point estimates (both
statistically significant and insignificant) for all loans-and-savings MFIs, whereas the second column
contains results from the same regression estimated using a sample of statistically significant scope
(dis)economies estimates only (i.e., statistically positive and negative DGSE point estimates). The
third column presents results from the probit model with an indicator outcome variable correspond-
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Figure 5. Yearly Distribution of the Degree of Scope Economies Estimates
ing to significantly positive “scope economies” and its negating alternative “scope non-economies,”
otherwise. The two categories are based on whether DGSE point estimates are statistically greater
than zero or not. Since probit coefficients cannot be readily interpreted, the last column reports
estimates of the corresponding average marginal effects on the propensity that an MFI exhibits
significant scope economies (over non-economies).
We begin by examining the relationship between scope economies and the size of MFIs. While
one generally expects a negative relationship between the degree of scale economies (returns to
scale) and the firm size, economic theory is however far less clear on such relationship in the case
of scope economies. The results in Table 8 indicate that larger MFIs are less likely to exhibit scope
economies with, on average, 1% increase in the size being associated with about 0.10% point lower
DGSE point estimates (overall and statistically significant only). Looking at the MFIs’ propensity
of exhibiting significantly positive scope economies, we also find that larger MFIs are less likely to
enjoy scope economies (the average marginal effect is –0.21). Figure 6 provides additional insights
into the said relationship. It shows the distribution ofDGSE point estimates across sample quintiles
of the MFI size in the form of box-plots. Based on our preferred model, the data point to a clear
inverse relationship suggesting that smaller loans-and-savings MFIs are the ones capitalizing on
positive scope economies.27 Therefore, while deposit-collecting MFIs often must meet the size
entry barriers to obtain a license to start collecting savings, such larger MFIs are less likely to
benefit from scope economies associated with jointly lending and mobilizing deposits.
Relative to the reference group of newly established MFIs (with fewer than 3 years since in-
ception), “young” and “mature” MFIs generally have 3% point smaller DGSE estimates although
there is no statistically significant relationship with the associated probability of significantly posi-
27In our data, we are unable to distinguish between mandatory and voluntary savings and the proportion thereof
within the “savings” variable because we only have a total measure of savings. Therefore, we evaluate scope
economies for different MFIs categorized by the total savings to assets ratio: 0.1 or more, 0.2 or more, and 0.3 or
more. We do not find significant differences in the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated scope
economies across these categories.
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Table 8. Scope Economies Regressions
OLS Probit
(1) (2) Coeff. AME
log(Size) –0.0988*** –0.1144*** –1.6665*** –0.2110***
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.1014) (0.0040)
Age: Young –0.0358*** –0.0336*** 0.3298 0.0417
(0.0110) (0.0113) (0.2185) (0.0277)
Age: Mature –0.0315*** –0.0306*** 0.2127 0.0269
(0.0109) (0.0114) (0.2234) (0.0284)
Equity-to-Assets Ratio 0.0055 –0.0066 –0.8672** –0.1098**
(0.0181) (0.0200) (0.4193) (0.0531)
log(Price of Fin. Capital) –0.0273*** –0.0407*** 0.0402 0.0051
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0988) (0.0125)
Risk 0.1260*** 0.0388 1.6620** 0.2104**
(0.0384) (0.0449) (0.8325) (0.1060)
Non-Profit –0.0051 0.0094 –0.2259 –0.0286
(0.0086) (0.0103) (0.2503) (0.0318)
Small Biz. Target Market –0.0267** –0.0307* –0.1981 –0.0251
(0.0117) (0.0168) (0.3306) (0.0420)
Broad Target Market –0.0010 –0.0024 0.1629 0.0206
(0.0057) (0.0064) (0.1559) (0.0197)
High-End Target Market –0.0051 –0.0051 0.2280 0.0289
(0.0109) (0.0121) (0.3643) (0.0464)
NGO –0.0010 –0.0286* 0.4686 0.0593
(0.0133) (0.0173) (0.3335) (0.0417)
Rural Bank –0.0166 –0.0212 –0.6050* –0.0766*
(0.0113) (0.0150) (0.3150) (0.0408)
NBFI 0.0146* –0.0111 0.3227 0.0409
(0.0087) (0.0109) (0.2898) (0.0362)
Credit Unions/Coops –0.0064 –0.0445*** –0.0402 –0.0051
(0.0124) (0.0164) (0.3408) (0.0432)
Other Legal Status –0.0687*** –0.1237*** –1.3534*** –0.1713***
(0.0209) (0.0193) (0.4180) (0.0540)
Africa 0.0070 0.0012 –0.2104 –0.0266
(0.0077) (0.0090) (0.1964) (0.0248)
E. Asia and the Pacific 0.0200** –0.0023 0.2215 0.0280
(0.0097) (0.0107) (0.2960) (0.0377)
E. Europe & C. Asia 0.0240*** 0.0206** –0.4114 –0.0521
(0.0083) (0.0092) (0.3483) (0.0437)
Middle East & N. Africa 0.0025 –0.0368***
(0.0138) (0.0106)
S. Asia 0.0039 –0.0211** –0.1208 –0.0153
(0.0084) (0.0094) (0.2233) (0.0282)
Year Effects X X X X
Obs 2,586 1,527 2,572
R2 0.853 0.912
Pseudo-R2 0.676
The regressions are based on the DGSE point estimates from our preferred model. The first
two OLS models use all [in (1)] or only statistically positive and negative DGSE estimates
[in (2)] as a left-hand-side variable. The probit model uses a binary indicator variable
categorizing each DGSE point estimates as corresponding to significant “scope economies”
or “scope non-economies”. The two categories are based on whether DGSE point estimates
are statistically greater than zero or not. The last column report the average marginal effects
(AMEs) on the probability of an MFI exhibiting significantly positive scope economies.
MFIs with the legal status of a bank targeting “low-end” clients in Latin America are the
reference group. The dummy for MENA (along with the 14 corresponding observations) is
omitted from the probit model due to being a perfect predictor. Clustered (at the individual
level) standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 6. Degree of Scope Economies Estimates by (log) Size Quintiles
tive scope economies. These results suggest no improvement in the potential for scope-driven cost
savings with age. On the contrary, the OLS results indicate that MFIs that start off as loans-and-
savings generally enjoy larger cost savings from offering deposits as well as loans, but these cost
savings may not be preserved later in their life cycle.
The results in Table 8 further show that the level of capitalization (the equity-to-assets ratio)
does not systematically associate with the magnitude of the DGSE estimates. However, the likeli-
hood of these point estimates being statistically positive corresponding to scope economies is (sig-
nificantly) inversely, albeit weakly, related to the level of capitalization, with a 10% point increase
in the equity-to-assets ratio associated with a 0.011 lower likelihood of positive scope economies.
Along these lines of inquiry, we find that the cost of borrowed capital is negatively associated with
the degree of scope economies, whereby a 1% increase in the cost of financial capital is associated
with 2.7% point smaller overall DGSE estimates and 4.1% point smaller statistically significant
DGSE estimates, but there is no link to the probability of exhibiting significantly positive scope
economies. Since the cost of funds is inversely related to the degree of scope economies and equity
serves as a cushion to protect against risk, the magnitude and prevalence of scope economies among
MFIs is likely sensitive to the loan default risk. Indeed, we find that the riskiness of lending activ-
ity exhibits a significantly positive association with both the DGSE point estimates (coefficient of
0.13) and the conditional probability of significant scope economies with a non-negligible average
marginal impact on the latter of about 0.02 per 10% point increase in the portfolio at risk.
One of the most crucial discussions in microfinance today is the possibility of a “mission
drift” whereby, as MFIs go through commercialization (including the transformation into deposit-
collecting institutions) and diversify their products, the depth of outreach or the MFIs’ willingness
to serve the very poor may be sacrificed. The results from a selection equation have already pro-
vided evidence that the MFIs targeting the least poor microfinance clients are more likely to be
offering deposit accounts. The results from our scope economies regressions reported in the second
column of Table 8 show that the deposit-collecting MFIs targeting the least poor borrowers (small
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businesses) have about 2.7–3.1% point smaller degree of scope economies estimates relative to the
MFIs targeting the poorest (our reference group). There is no statistically significant difference
between the degree of scope economies exhibited by the MFIs targeting the poorest and those tar-
geting other clientele categories as classified by the loan size. There is also no significant difference
in the probability of having positive scope economies (when accounting for the sampling error in
their estimates) across the target market groups, thereby suggesting a certain degree of neutrality
and no statistically significant evidence of a mission drift motivated by cost savings due to scope
economies. This interpretation is also supported by the finding that the degree of scope economies
is largely unrelated to the MFI’s profit status.
Next, we look at the differences across organizational (legal) types of MFIs. We use banks as
the reference group because the deposit-collecting MFIs are most likely to seek to emulate banks’
behavior, and thus the MFIs organized as banks would have scope economies similar to those found
in regular commercial banks. The two groups of MFIs most similar to banks are rural banks and
credit unions (CUs, also known as financial cooperatives). We find that, relative to banks, credit
unions have smaller statistically significant DGSE estimates by 4.5% points, whereas rural banks
are less likely to exhibit scope economies, on average, by 7.7%. Since we control for the institution’s
size, capitalization, age and the target market, it appears that the MFI’s organizational form itself
is associated with the variation in scope economies. While the findings pertaining to rural banks
are somewhat expected because serving remote rural populations is harder, it is interesting that
the same is observed for credit unions which typically serve clients in smaller geographic areas. The
results for the MFIs operating as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which is a legal form
most different from banks, only show that, relative to banks, NGOs on average have a 2.9% point
smaller magnitude of statistically significant DGSE estimates but generally are not more likely to
have significantly positive scope economies. The results for MFIs operating as non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs), an organizational form used when a country’s regulatory environment allows
non-bank, non-CU and non-NGO organizations to operate as deposit-collecting MFIs, show that
they enjoy somewhat higher degree of scope economies relative to banks overall (by 1.5% point)
but the differences in magnitudes of significant DGSE estimates are insignificant. Finally, for the
15 organizations in our sample registered as “other” as the best alternative under their country’s
regulations permitting them to collect deposits, we observe that they have about 6.8% point smaller
DGSE estimates, and 12.4% point smaller statistically significant DGSE estimates than banks,
and are about 17% more likely on average to have scope diseconomies. This may be plausibly
attributed to the inhospitable regulatory environments in which these MFIs might be operating.
We also examine geographical differences in scope economies, and our results are largely con-
sistent with previous microfinance studies showing a regional variation in the MFI performance,
prevalence of scope economies and the interaction thereof with the overall economy (Lopatta &
Tchikov, 2016; Hartarska et al., 2013). As a reference group, we choose the MFIs in the Latin
America because they include some of the oldest as well as recently established institutions; they
also have capital and organizational structures very similar to the industry average. We find no
significant differences in the estimates of the degree of scope economies across the Latin American
MFIs and those in Africa. However, MFIs in the Eastern Europe and East Asia, on average, have
about 2% point higher DGSE point estimates, but only those in the Eastern Europe continue to
have higher estimates when we account for the sample error in the DGSE estimates. The regres-
sion results also show that MFIs in the MENA region have on average 3.7% point, and those in
the Southeast Asia have 2.1% point, smaller estimates of statistically significant DGSE estimates.
We find no systematic differences across regions in terms of the probability of exhibiting scope
economies.
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Figure 7. Bivariate Relationship between the Degree of Scope Economies and Returns to Scale
Estimates: (a) Contours of the Estimated Joint Density; (b) Fitted Quantiles (solid) with the
Corresponding Two-Sided 95% Bootstrap Confidence Bounds (dashed)
Overall, the regression results point to limited differences in scope economies across organiza-
tional types and geographic locations of MFIs. We do document consistent differences in terms
of capitalization and the cost of borrowed funds as well as in terms of the size with smaller MFIs
found to be more likely to have scope economies. This suggests that smaller loans-and-savings
MFIs are the primary beneficiaries of scope economies but, since they are small, they may also
have not taken a full advantage of their scale economies. (Recall that all MFIs are found to almost
universally exhibit increasing returns to scale.) The untapped potential to drive the costs of these
institutions further down by capitalizing on significant increasing returns to scale via expanding
their operations can also be inferred from Figure 7. It depicts a contour plot of the bivariate den-
sity of DGSE and RTS point estimates across MFIs, which enables us to assess the relationship
between the two not just at some fixed moment but distribution-wise; it is complemented by the
plot of the same relationship at different quantiles. Both sub-figures point to a positive relation
between the degrees of scope and scale economies with the MFIs exhibiting diseconomies of scope
also having increasing returns to scale but of smaller magnitudes than the MFIs enjoying scope
economies. These findings compare well to Delgado et al.’s (2015) who too find that, prior to
2006, the majority of MFIs enjoying scope economies also exhibited increasing returns to scale. In
contrast to our finding of almost universal scale economies in the industry, they however find that
diseconomies of scope tend to go hand-in-hand with decreasing returns to scale.
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6 Conclusion
Scope economies ensuing from the joint offering of loans and savings accounts (as opposed to loans
only) are customarily invoked to promote the transformation of credit-only microfinance institutions
(MFIs) into integrated loans-and-savings entities. To ensure robust inference, this paper estimates
scope economies for the microfinance industry using a novel approach which accommodates inher-
ent heterogeneity across loans-only and loans-and-savings MFIs as well as controls for endogenous
self-selection of institutions into the either type. In contrast to popular alternatives employed in
the microfinance literature, our measurement of the degree of scope economies does not rely on a
rather unrealistic assumption whereby specialized loans-only MFIs share the same technology with
and incur the same fixed costs as do the integrated loans-and-savings MFIs, which substantially de-
creases the reliance of our estimates on counterfactuals and minimizes the “excessive extrapolation”
problem. We therefore are able to offer policy-makers and stakeholders a fresher and more robust
perspective on benefits and costs of promoting integrated loans-and-savings MFIs on grounds of
the cost savings potential due to scope economies.
Using recent data on about a thousand MFIs from 76 countries operating in 2004–2014, we find
that the microfinance industry largely exhibits scope invariance with the median degree of scope
economies being statistically indistinguishable from zero, and scope economies are significantly
positive for less than a half of loans-and-savings MFIs. For a non-trivial 14% of institutions, the
empirical evidence suggests the existence of significant diseconomies of scope indicating that the
separate production of loans and savings accounts actually has the potential to reduce an MFI’s
costs. This suggest that it may be ill-advised to invoke scope economies as a blanket justification
for universal expansion of the scope of financial operations by MFIs. We also find that failure
to account for self-selection dramatically overestimates the degree of scope economies resulting
in the failure to detect scope diseconomies among MFIs. A more in-depth analysis shows very
small differences in the estimates of the degree of scope economies among MFIs based on their
geographic region, organizational type or age. The results most prominently suggest a negative
relation between the extent of scope economies and the MFI’s size or cost of capital and a positive
relation with the level of capitalization. The analysis of temporal dynamics in scope economies
shows that their magnitude as well as the prevalence in the industry have been steadily declining,
especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
Appendix
A Deposits as Outputs: Additional Evidence
Table A.1 reports point estimates of the cost elasticity of deposits obtained from the first-difference
estimator of C (w1, w2, x3, e, y1, y2) for loans-and-savings MFIs using the translog specification.
The left-hand-side C variable is a sum of expenses on x1 and x2 only. The point estimates are
overwhelmingly positive, as can be seen in Figure A.1 which plots the histogram of these elasticity
estimates. The mean elasticity is estimated at the (one-sidedly) statistically positive 0.095. Overall,
the non-interest cost elasticity of deposits is statistically greater than zero for 90% of the sample.
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Table A.1. Non-Interest Cost Elasticity of Deposits in
the Loans-and-Savings MFIs
Point One-Sided
Estimate Lower Bound
10th Percentile 0.046 0.007
1st Quartile 0.071 0.033
Median 0.098 0.060
3rd Quartile 0.125 0.084
90th Percentile 0.144 0.106
Mean 0.095 0.059
Reported are the estimates of ∂ log C/∂ log y2 from
the translog C (w1, w2, x3, e, y1, y2) function with
C being a sum of expenses on x1 and x2. The
lower bounds are for the one-sided 95% percentile
block-bootstrap confidence intervals, with the cor-
responding upper bounds being +∞.
Figure A.1. Distribution of Non-Interest
Cost Elasticity of Deposits in the
Loans-and-Savings MFIs
B Monotonicity Regularity Conditions
To impose the monotonicity conditions on the cost functions, we rewrite the estimator in (3.8) as
a weighted average of the outcome variable, i.e.,[
β̂r
vec{B̂r}
]
=
∑
i
pii∆ log(Cr,it), (B.1)
where pii =
[∑
i ∆mr,it∆m
′
r,itDr,itK̂r,it
]−1 ×∆mr,itDr,itK̂r,it is the data-dependent weight.
Following Hall & Huang (2001), we can rewrite (B.1) in a more general form as follows[
β̂r(p)
vec{B̂r(p)}
]
= N
∑
i
pipii∆ log(Cr,it), (B.2)
where p = (p1, . . . , pN )
′ is the sequence of additional weights such that
∑
i=1 pi = 1. Note that pi
equals 1/N (i.e., uniform weights) in the case of an unconstrained estimator in (B.1).
When necessary, we can impose the monotonicity conditions by selecting p that minimizes
the L2-type metric D(p) = (1/N iN − p)′(1/N iN − p) subject to i′Np = 1 and the monotonicity
conditions that all can be written in the form of R
[
β̂r(p)
′, vec{B̂r(p)}′
]′
> 0N , where R is the
data-dependent design matrix, iN is an N×1 vector of ones, and 0N is an N×1 vector of zeros. The
objective function D(p) is the sum of squared deviations of pi from the unrestricted value of 1/N .
In our choice of the distance metric, we follow Du et al. (2013) over Hall & Huang (2001) because
it allows p to be both positive and negative. The minimization problem is solved via a standard
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quadratic programming technique. Let p̂ be the solution to this optimization problem. Then, the
constrained estimator of unknown parameters is given by
(
β̂r(p̂)
′, vec{B̂r(p̂)}′
)′
for r = 1, 2.
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